UIC School of Law

UIC Law Open Access Repository
UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship
2022

Review of Veterans Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 2021
Edition, 71 Am. U. L. Rev. 1619 (2022)
Angela Drake
Yelena Duterte
Stacey Rae Simcox

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/facpubs
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons
https://repository.law.uic.edu/facpubs/878
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access
Repository. For more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

AREA SUMMARIES
REVIEW OF VETERANS LAW DECISIONS OF
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, 2021 EDITION
ANGELA DRAKE,* YELENA DUTERTE,** & STACEY-RAE SIMCOX***
In the past year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(Federal Circuit) continued to define boundaries for the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) and the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans
Court). These boundaries align more closely with congressional intent, especially
with regard to the jurisdiction of the Veterans Court and the internal operations
of the agency.
This Area Summary discusses eight major areas in which the Federal Circuit
articulated important changes in veterans law. First, the Federal Circuit
revisited the important and veteran-friendly “benefit of the doubt” rule in Lynch
and modified it. In Lynch, the Court analyzed the term “approximate balance”
and instructed VA to liberally consider evidence and apply the benefit of the
doubt rule even where the evidence is not in exact equipoise. Second, the Federal
Circuit limited the Veterans Court’s power to fact-find and narrowed its power
to find prejudicial error in Tadlock. Third, in Anania, the Court strengthened
the “mailbox” rule by finding that the claimant’s, or advocate’s, own affidavit
sufficiently proved proper mailing. Fourth, the Court broadened the constructive
* Professor Drake directs the Veterans Clinic at the University of Missouri School of
Law. She thanks 3L students Emily Bergmann and Joel Smith for their help in
preparing portions of this Area Summary on the heels of their hard work in preparing
the National Law School Veterans Clinic Consortium amicus brief in Taylor v.
McDonough, discussed further below.
** Professor Duterte is an Assistant Professor of Law and the Director of the
Veterans Legal Clinic at University of Illinois Chicago School of Law in Chicago, Illinois.
*** Professor Simcox directs the Veterans Law Institute and the Veterans Advocacy
Clinic at Stetson University College of Law. She would like to thank Elanna Lochan and
Morgan MacIsaac for their feedback and help researching portions of this Area
Summary. And, of course, her ever-patient family.

1619

1620

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1619

possession rules relating to VA-contracted medical reports in Euzebio. Fifth, the
Federal Circuit looked to principles of equity in Arellano and Taylor to
determine whether tolling or estoppel may be invoked when the question relates
to the effective date for the grant of VA benefits. Sixth, the Court clarified effective
date rules in Kisor, George, Ortiz, and Buffington. Seventh, in MilitaryVeterans Advocacy, the Federal Circuit overturned three regulations
promulgated under the new Appeals Modernization Act, each related to
supplemental claims—a new avenue for veterans seeking to reopen earlier
decisions. Finally, in Smith, the Court continued to weigh in on attorney’s fees,
an important issue for veterans and their advocates.
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I. REVISITING THE APPLICATION OF THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT RULE
In the 2021 decision Lynch v. McDonough,1 the Federal Circuit
considered one of the most integral aspects of the non-adversarial
nature of veterans law: the “benefit of the doubt” rule.2 This rule has
always been an important part of veterans law—since the Civil War one
hundred years ago to its current existence as a statutory directive in the
Veterans’ Judicial Review Act (VJRA) of 1988.3 The purpose of the
benefit of the doubt rule is to provide a distinct advantage to veterans
when evidence regarding “service origin, the degree of disability, or
any other point,” material to a determination of their claims, gives rise
to a “reasonable doubt” concerning the disability’s connection to
service.4 As codified, the benefit of the doubt doctrine provides:
The Secretary shall consider all information and lay and medical
evidence of record in a case before the Secretary with respect to

1. 21 F.4th 776 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (en banc).
2. See id. at 778 (hearing arguments that prior Court decisions wrongly decided
the standard to trigger the benefit of the doubt rule).
3. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55 (1990); Veterans’ Judicial Review Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
4. 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2019).
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benefits under laws administered by the Secretary. When there is
an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding
any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary
shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.5

The implementing regulation, which was partially in effect when
Congress passed the VJRA, provides:
When, after careful consideration of all procurable and
assembled data, a reasonable doubt arises regarding service origin,
the degree of disability, or any other point, such doubt will be
resolved in favor of the claimant.
By reasonable doubt is meant one which exists because of
an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence which does
not satisfactorily prove or disprove the claim. It is a substantial doubt
and one within the range of probability as distinguished from pure
speculation or remote possibility. It is not a means of reconciling
actual conflict or a contradiction in the evidence. Mere suspicion or
doubt as to the truth of any statements submitted, as distinguished
from impeachment or contradiction by evidence or known facts, is
not justifiable basis for denying the application of the reasonable
doubt doctrine if the entire, complete record otherwise warrants
invoking this doctrine.6

In 1990, the newly formed Veterans Court reviewed the history of
the rule in Gilbert v. Derwinski.7 Over the past thirty years, the resulting
explanation is often cited when it comes to understanding
“approximate balance”:
[T]he “benefit of the doubt” standard is similar to the rule deeply
embedded in sandlot baseball folklore that “the tie goes to
the runner.” If the ball clearly beats the runner, he is out and the
rule has no application; if the runner clearly beats the ball, he is safe
and, again, the rule has no application; if, however, the play is close,
then the runner is called safe by operation of the rule that
“the tie goes to the runner.” . . . Similarly, if a fair preponderance of
the evidence is against a veteran’s claim, it will be denied and the
“benefit of the doubt” rule has no application; if the veteran
establishes a claim by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the
claim will be granted and, again, the rule has no application; if,
however, the play is close, i.e., “there is an approximate balance of
positive and negative evidence,” the veteran prevails . . . .8

5.
6.
7.
8.

38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2018) (emphasis added).
38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (emphasis added).
Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 55.
Id. at 55–56.
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In 2001, the Federal Circuit revisited the application of
“approximate balance” in Ortiz v. Principi.9 In Ortiz, the Board of
Veterans’ Appeals denied a veteran service connection for a back
condition that the veteran believed was caused by a slip-and-fall in the
shower during his active-duty service.10 In denying Mr. Ortiz’s claim,
the Board found his statements concerning the slip-and-fall lacked
credibility.11 On appeal, the Veterans Court held that the benefit of the
doubt rule did not apply because the Board determined that a
preponderance of the evidence was against Mr. Ortiz’s claim12 Mr.
Ortiz again appealed, challenging the Veterans Court’s assertion that
the benefit of the doubt rule is inapplicable in cases where the Board
finds a preponderance of the evidence against the veteran’s claim.13
On appeal, the Federal Circuit conducted an exercise in statutory
interpretation regarding the benefit of the doubt rule using the plain
language of the statute.14 It determined that “evidence is in
‘approximate balance’ when the evidence in favor of and opposing the
veteran’s claim is found to be ‘almost exact[ly or] nearly’ ‘equal.’”15
The court then invoked the “tie goes to the runner” baseball analogy
of Gilbert to emphasize that nearly equal means a decision that is “too
close to call.”16 This standard is different from a finding that a
preponderance of the evidence is for or against a decision, which
“describe[s] a state of proof that persuades the factfinders that the
points in question are ‘more probably so than not.’”17 The court held
that once a preponderance of the evidence is found “either for or
against the veteran’s claim,” the evidence cannot be “‘nearly equal’ or
‘too close to call,’” thus the benefit of the doubt cannot apply in cases
where the preponderance of the evidence exists.18

9. 274 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
10. Id. at 1363.
11. See id. (finding the supporting medical opinions to be of “limited probative
value” because the opinions were based only on the veteran’s accounts of his injury).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1364.
14. See id. (“Any question of statutory interpretation begins with the language of
the statute itself.”).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1365.
17. Id. (citing to MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 3.3 (1995)).
18. See id. at 1365–66 (concluding that a finding in which the positive and negative
evidence is in “approximate balance” cannot result in a finding that evidence
preponderates one way or the other).
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The court also noted that another characterization of the benefit of
the doubt rule can be expressed as “shifting the ‘risk of nonpersuasion’
to VA to prove that the veteran is not entitled to benefits.”19
From that perspective, if the Board finds that the positive and negative
evidence relating to a veteran’s claim are in “approximate balance,”
then the placement of the risk of nonpersuasion on the VA dictates a
finding in favor of the claimant. If, however, the Board determines
that the preponderance of the evidence is against the veteran’s
claim, then it necessarily has been persuaded to find in favor of the
VA, and thus the VA has overcome its risk of nonpersuasion. Under
either view of the benefit of the doubt rule, the result is the same.
Accordingly, we conclude that a finding that evidence preponderates in
one direction precludes a finding that the positive and negative
evidence is in “approximate balance,” and we therefore interpret the
clear and unambiguous language of § 5107(b) and its accompanying
regulation to have no application where the Board determines that the
preponderance of the evidence weighs against the veteran’s claim.20

Based upon the Board’s conclusion that the evidence for Mr. Ortiz’s
claim “preponderates in one direction,” the evidence could not be in
approximate balance and the benefit of the doubt rule did not apply.21
The holding in Ortiz has been cited hundreds of times by the
Veterans Court when it has reviewed Board decisions finding against a
veteran’s claims. The Federal Circuit considered Lynch v. McDonough
in the shadow of Ortiz.
A. Lynch v. McDonough
In March 2016, Mr. Lynch filed a claim for post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) with VA.22 VA granted his claim, rating his
impairment at thirty percent.23 Mr. Lynch appealed this rating.24 When
the Board considered his claim, there were two private medical
evaluations in the record which supported an increased rating and two
VA medical examinations which did not.25 Based upon these
examinations, the Board found that a preponderance of the evidence

19. Id. at 1365.
20. Id. at 1365–66.
21. Id. at 1366.
22. Lynch v. McDonough, 999 F.3d 1391, 1391–93 (Fed. Cir. 2021), vacated, 21
F.4th 776 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1393.
25. Id.
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indicated Mr. Lynch was entitled to only a thirty percent rating.26 Mr.
Lynch appealed to the Veterans Court and argued that the Board did
not appropriately apply the benefit of the doubt rule to his claim.27 The
Veterans Court relied on Ortiz to hold that Mr. Lynch’s claim was not
entitled to application of the benefit of the doubt rule because the
Board found that a preponderance of the evidence was against his
claim.28
Mr. Lynch then appealed to the Federal Circuit. He argued that the
Ortiz decision should be overturned.29 Mr. Lynch asserted that Ortiz
“read the modifier ‘approximate’ out of the term ‘approximate
balance’ set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) by requiring an equal or even
balance of the evidence to give the benefit of the doubt to the
claimant.”30 This, he argued, is in contrast to Congress’ specific use of
the word “approximate” to create “a standard of proof lower than
equipoise-of-the-evidence for veterans, and conversely, higher than
preponderance-of-the-evidence” for VA.31 Mr. Lynch asserted that the
Federal Circuit’s case law relying upon Ortiz since that 2001 decision
similarly required that veterans meet an “equipoise of evidence”
standard before applying the benefit of the doubt rule to their claims.32
Initially, in a panel decision written by Judge Prost and joined by
Judge Clevenger, the majority flatly refuted the aforementioned
concerns and asserted that Ortiz applied the “benefit of the doubt” rule
in both situations where the evidence was in equipoise and in situations
where the evidence was nearly in equipoise.33 The opinion stated that
it was bound by Ortiz’s language, which provides that when the Board
believes that a preponderance of the evidence weighs for or against a
claim, then the evidence is necessarily not “nearly equal.” The court
subsequently affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision.34
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
29. Appellant’s Corrected Opening Brief at 16–17, Lynch v. McDonough, 999 F.3d
1391 (No. 20-2067).
30. Id. at 12.
31. Id. at 13; see also id. at 16 n.5 (citing Skoczen v. Shinseki, 564 F.3d 1319, 1324
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (emphasis omitted) (defining the equipoise-of-the-evidence standard
as an “equality of the evidence standard” that requires evidence to “rise to a state of
equipoise for the claimant to win”)).
32. Br. of Pet’r-Appellant Appellant’s Corrected Opening Br. at 17–18.
33. Lynch, 999 F.3d at 1395 (emphasizing that Ortiz included scenarios where
evidence that was is not in equipoise was still in approximate balance).
34. Id. at 1395.
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In his dissent, Judge Dyk asserted that portions of the Ortiz decision
were indeed inconsistent with the plain language of 38 U.S.C.
§ 5107(b).35 Though the court withdrew the panel decision when they
issued a later en banc decision, Judge Dyk’s dissent remains instructive
because the en banc decision considered and addressed his concerns,
which created a major departure from Ortiz’s applicability to future
cases.36
While Judge Dyk agreed that Ortiz defines “approximately equal” as
the standard to apply with regard to the benefit of the doubt rule, he
urged the court to disregard the dicta in Ortiz that indicated there was
a requirement for an equipoise of the evidence.37 Specifically, Judge
Dyk took issue with the “confusing” language of Ortiz and the majority
in Lynch concerning the preponderance of the evidence.38 Judge Dyk
pointed out that the Federal Circuit and other courts explained in
previous cases that preponderance refers to “the greater weight of
evidence” and “may be found when the evidence only slightly favors
one party.”39 This slight tipping of evidence in favor of one side or
another as a definition of “preponderance” is at odds with Ortiz’s
definition of “approximate balance” because “‘[a]pproximate’ is not
the same as ‘slight.’”40
Understanding the definition of “approximate balance” by
comparing it to a preponderance of the evidence puts a veteran at a
disadvantage—a situation not intended by the statute:
It is not difficult to imagine a range of cases in which the evidence is
in approximate balance between the veteran and the government
(and the veteran should recover), but still slightly favors the
government (and under the majority’s test, the veteran would not
recover).
Ortiz’s holding effectively and impermissibly restricts the benefit-ofthe-doubt rule to cases in which there is close to an evidentiary tie, a
proposition that the majority agrees would be contrary to the
“approximate balance” language of the statute. Indeed, the
35. Id. at 1396.
36. See Lynch v. McDonough, 21 F.4th 776, 781 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (en banc)
(“The earlier opinion in this case, reported at 999 F.3d 1391 (Fed. Cir. 2021), is
withdrawn, and this opinion substituted therefor.”).
37. See Lynch, 999 F.3d at 1396 (finding that the dicta’s suggestion “that the benefitof-the-doubt rule applies only in the context of an evidentiary tie” was “inconsistent
with the plain text of § 5107(b)”).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1397.
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government appeared to agree at oral argument that when the
evidence against a veteran’s claim is equal to “equipoise plus a mere
peppercorn,” denying the benefit-of-the-doubt rule would be
contrary to statute.41

Mr. Lynch requested en banc reconsideration and the Federal
Circuit issued a new decision authored again by Judge Prost. Eight
other judges joined, including Judge Dyk.42 Judge Reyna authored a
concurrence-in-part and dissent-in-part which Judges Newman and
O’Malley joined.43
The en banc decision aligned with the panel’s decision, finding that
Ortiz’s specific inclusion of the definition of “approximate balance”
“includes scenarios where the evidence is not in equipoise but
nevertheless is in approximate balance.”44 The court then rebutted the
assertion that its decisions had required an equipoise of evidence
before applying the benefit of the doubt rule, but it did acknowledge
that some Veterans Court’s decisions since Ortiz have required
“equipoise,” which is the incorrect standard.45
Reiterating the holding of Ortiz, the Federal Circuit held:
So, let us be clear. Under § 5107(b) and Ortiz, a claimant is to receive
the benefit of the doubt when there is an “approximate balance” of
positive and negative evidence, which Ortiz interpreted as “nearly
equal” evidence. This interpretation necessarily includes scenarios
where the evidence is not in equipoise but nevertheless is in
approximate balance. Put differently, if the positive and negative
evidence is in approximate balance (which includes but is not
limited to equipoise), the claimant receives the benefit of the
doubt.46

The majority en banc opinion then addressed the concerns Judge Dyk
expressed regarding Ortiz’s confusing explanation of “preponderance of
the evidence.”47 The Federal Circuit acknowledged that Ortiz could be
misunderstood and officially departed from describing “approximate

41. Id. (citation omitted).
42. Lynch v. McDonough, 21 F.4th 776, 777 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (en banc).
43. Id. at 777, 782.
44. Id. at 781.
45. See id. at 780–81. (finding the “Veterans Court’s recitation in Chotta of the
standard is incorrect”) (citing Chotta v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 80, 86 (2008), overruled by
Lynch, 21 F.4th at 780–81).
46. Id. at 781.
47. Id.
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balance” in terms of a “preponderance of evidence” standard.48 The
majority held that the correct view is that “approximate balance” most
closely approximates “nearly equal.”49 The benefit of the doubt
standard does not apply when “the Board ‘has been persuaded’ to
find” for or against a veteran’s claim.50 The court also explicitly
declined to overturn Ortiz and insisted that the Lynch decision was
merely a clarification.51 The Federal Circuit then affirmed the Veterans
Court’s decision.52
In his concurring/dissenting opinion, Judge Reyna agreed that
Ortiz’s language needed to be corrected.53 However, he criticized the
majority’s inability to admit that it was overturning Ortiz’s
“preponderance of evidence” standard in favor of a “persuasion of
evidence standard.”54 Additionally, Judge Reyna noted that, much like
a preponderance standard, the statute did not contemplate a
persuasion standard, and the persuasion standard would make it much
more difficult for veterans to appeal Board decisions when a case is a
“close call.”55
Judge Reyna’s concern stems from the fact that the majority’s new
standard did not require the Board to disclose when it considers
evidence “close” but still sufficiently persuasive for the Board to
foreclose a veteran’s claim.56 Without this admission, the record is
incomplete and veterans would have a difficult time arguing to the
Veterans Court that the benefit of the doubt rule should have been
applied in their case.57 Judge Reyna suggests that the Board be
required to indicate when the evidence is a “close call,” as an aid to
subsequent appellate review and proper application of the benefit of
the doubt rule.58
48. See id. (departing from Ortiz to “eliminate the potential for confusion going
forward”).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 781–82.
51. Id. at 782 (“To be clear, Ortiz (and the instant case) were not wrongly
decided.”).
52. Id.
53. See id. (concurring with the majority’s rejection of the Ortiz preponderance of
evidence standard).
54. See id. (dissenting with the majority’s “refusal to overturn Ortiz in its entirety”).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 783.
57. See id. (noting that a lack of admission would shield VA determinations from
“meaningful appellate review”).
58. Id.
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B. Impact of Lynch on VA and the Benefit of the Doubt Rule
Judge Dyk’s discussion highlighting the confusion over the word
“preponderance” is insightful, and Lynch’s recharacterization of the
term “persuasion” to “eliminate the potential for confusion”59 is likely
not helpful to veterans. While it appears Ortiz intended to give some
buffer to the veterans on either side of an evenly balanced scale,
determining how much evidence equates to “persuasion” is tricky. Ortiz
mentioned that the preponderance standard “is not amenable to any
mathematical formula, such as the often-recited ‘fifty-one
percent/forty-nine percent’ rule . . . [r]ather, a preponderance of the
evidence can be said to ‘describe a state of proof that persuades the
factfinders that the points in question are ‘more probably so than
not.’”60 The Federal Circuit previously considered the persuasion
standard when it issued Ortiz, even if the use of the word
preponderance muddied the waters.
While the Federal Circuit may understand its persuasion standard, it
is unlikely it will be easily understood by VA for three reasons. The
difficulty will hinder proper application of the benefit of the doubt
doctrine.
First, the decision as to whether the evidence is “nearly equal” or has
passed an invisible line into “persuasion” is made by Board of Veterans’
Appeals Judges who are employees of VA.61 There is tension when VA
employees making decisions must pit a veteran’s private medical
evidence against VA’s own medical examinations. This tension can be
seen in VA’s regulations. VA reminds employees that “[p]roceedings
before VA are ex parte in nature, and it is the obligation of VA to assist
a claimant in developing the facts pertinent to the claim and to render
a decision which grants every benefit that can be supported in law
while protecting the interests of the Government.”62 One former Chief
of Policy and Procedure for the Board of Veterans’ Appeals described
this standard as requiring VA employees to be both advocates and
adjudicators.63 Asking a VA employee to determine when evidence
against a veteran’s claim is “nearly equal” versus slightly in favor of

59. Id.
60. Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
61. 38 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7101A(a)(1).
62. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (2019).
63. James D. Ridgway, Why so Many Remands?: A Comparative Analysis of Appellate
Review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 1 VETERANS L. REV. 113,
126–27 (2009).
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VA—so a claim may be granted—seems to place VA employees into a
moral quandary.
Second, the Veterans Court does not have the power to review
factual determinations, such as the balancing of evidence, de novo.64
The Veterans Court can only review these Board determinations under
a clearly erroneous standard. This standard applies to an error that
leaves a reviewing court with the firm conviction that a mistake has
been made.65 In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous,
the Veterans Court “is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that
of the [Board] on issues of material fact; if there is a ‘plausible’ basis
in the record for the factual determinations of the [Board] . . . [the
court] cannot overturn them.”66
Given the clearly erroneous standard applicable to factual findings,
it is highly unlikely that the Veterans Court will reverse any finding in
which the Board was “persuaded” by the evidence that a veteran’s claim
should not be granted.
In the twenty years between Ortiz and Lynch, the Veterans Court
considered Board decisions regarding the preponderance of the
evidence standard, as described in Ortiz, and the benefit of the doubt
application several hundred times.67 In only five of these cases did the
court find the Board’s determinations clearly erroneous.68 Because the
64. See id. at 141–42 (discussing how the Veterans Court cannot reach issues with
which the Board did not make any factual finding, and that factor “frustrates effective
judicial review”).
65. See, e.g., Russo v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 46, 50 (1996) (applying the Veterans
Court’s “clearly erroneous” standard of review). See generally, United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (“A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”).
66. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990) (disclaiming the Veterans
Court’s ability to overturn Board decisions under the clearly erroneous standard “even
if [the] Court might not have reached the same factual determinations”).
67. Opinions citing Ortiz and discussing the preponderance of the evidence
standard span multiple years and multiple Secretaries of Veterans Affairs. See, e.g.,
Padgett v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 133, 146 (2005), rev’d and remanded, 473 F.3d 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2007); Skoczen v. Peake, No. 06-0127, 2007 WL 4570718, at *1–2 (Dec. 21,
2007); Anderson v. Peake, No. 06-1724, 2009 WL 59154, at *2–3 (Jan. 12, 2009);
Mendenhall v. McDonald, No. 13-2422, 2014 WL 4784319, at *2 (Sept. 25, 2014);
Holland v. Wilkie, No. 18-1315, 2019 WL 347672, at *3 & nn.26 & 30 (Jan. 29, 2019).
68. See Padgett, 19 Vet. App. at 145–47 (finding that the Board incorrectly declared
that evidence preponderated against veteran’s claim despite veteran’s claim being “the
only plausible resolution”); Schuster v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 418, at *2 (2005)
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clearly erroneous standard is such a high standard, it is (and was)
unlikely a veteran could prevail at the Veterans Court with the
argument that marginal evidence tipping the scales one way is not a
preponderance, and should instead be considered in “approximate
balance.” Now that the standard is “persuasion,” which seems to be a
lesser standard than “preponderance,” Board decisions concerning
the application of the benefit of the doubt rule will likely be harder to
review for clear error. Courts have not yet provided decisions
implementing Lynch to explain when evidence is persuasive versus
preponderant.
Third, historically the Veterans Court has had a difficult time
understanding Ortiz’s “approximate balance” standard in light of the
dicta regarding “preponderance.” There are many examples of the
Veterans Court holding that the benefit of the doubt doctrine may only
be applied when the evidence is in equipoise, citing to Ortiz and its
progeny as the authority for its decisions.69 The Federal Circuit now
(concluding that faulty assessments and failures to address possible nexuses resulted
in a clearly erroneous ruling); Bruce v. McDonald, No. 15-3237, 2017 WL 57172, at *3
(Vet. App. Jan. 5, 2017) (concluding that a failure to demonstrate one outcome was
more likely than the outcome argued by the veteran in this case constituted a clearly
erroneous finding of fact); Cohen v. Shinseki, No. 09-3769, 2011 WL 2636968, at *7–8
(Vet. App. Jul. 6, 2011) (finding the Board’s decision to be clearly erroneous because
“the preponderance of the evidence is not against a finding of nexus” between the
veteran’s service injury and current condition); Curle v. Shinseki, No. 08-1824, 2010
WL 326034, at *1, *7 (Vet. App. Jan. 29, 2010) (concluding that the Board’s finding
that the veteran’s heart disease was neither caused nor aggravated by the veteran’s
PTSD was without sufficient basis and thus clearly erroneous).
69. See, e.g., Chotta v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 80, 86 (2008), abrogated by Lynch v.
McDonough, 21 F.4th 776 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Finally, the Court recognizes that the
evidence must be at least in equipoise to award a benefit, including a particular rating.”
(citing Ortiz v. Principi (citation omitted)); Fagan v. Peake, No. 06-1327, 2008 WL
2130166, at *3 (Vet. App. Feb. 29, 2008) (“This appeal presents a single question—the
interpretation and application of the benefit of the doubt doctrine codified at 38
U.S.C. § 5107(b). This doctrine, also referred to as the ‘equipoise’ standard, requires
that, ‘[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence
regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give
the benefit of the doubt to the claimant’ . . . . [B]ecause the evidence is not in
equipoise [in this case], the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not applicable”); Hawkins
v. Shinseki, No. 09-0842, 2010 WL 3034720, at *4 (Vet. App. Jul. 29, 2010)
(“The benefit of the doubt doctrine is only for use in cases where the evidence is
in equipoise . . . . Here, the Board was not required to discuss or apply the benefit of
the doubt rule because it did not find that the evidence was in equipoise.”); Myrkle v.
Wilkie, No. 19-7039, 2020 WL 7770892, at *3 (Vet. App. Dec. 30, 2020) (“Here, the

1632

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1619

indicates that the preponderance language of Ortiz was apparently an
unfortunate confusion of the actual standard which was the
persuasiveness of the evidence. Unfortunately, much like preponderance,
the Lynch decision does little to help the Veterans Court, or the Board,
gain a new understanding of when evidence crosses the line from
“approximate balance” to “persuasion.”
The bright side in Lynch is that the standard to apply the benefit of
the doubt rule can no longer be simply referred to as the “equipoise”
standard, which may open the door for VA and veterans to find a more
balanced approach to apply the rule.
The concern, which Judge Reyna shared, is that there is little
guidance concerning precisely how much evidence tilts the balance
one way or another. A lack of a clear and workable standard makes it
difficult to hold VA’s feet to the fire when enforcing application of the
benefit of the doubt rule. It also ensures this issue will continue to be
appealed to the courts until the standard is clarified.

Board found that the evidence weighed against Ms. Myrkle’s claim. Thus, the evidence
was not in equipoise and the benefit of the doubt was not for application.”); see also De
Ramos v. Shinseki, No. 07-0857, 2009 WL 278832, at *5 (Vet. App. Feb. 5, 2009)
(refusing to apply the benefit of the doubt doctrine because “the evidence was not in
equipoise”); Lott v. Shinseki, No. 09-2059, 2010 WL 2706256, at *7 (Vet. App. Jul. 6,
2010) (finding the Board did not clearly err because they properly determined the
evidence was not in equipoise); Campbell v. Shinseki, No. 08-1511, 2010 WL 2637819,
at *1, *7 (Vet. App. Jun. 30, 2010) (stating that the Court can assess the Board’s
determination of whether evidence is in equipoise for clear error); Bloom v. Shinseki,
No. 12-3415, 2013 WL 6823377, at *6 (Vet. App. Dec. 27, 2013) (stating that the Court
cannot make the “determination as to whether the evidence is in equipoise and apply
the benefit of the doubt doctrine,” but the Court can review the Board’s determination
of the same matter for clear error); Kinast v. Shinseki, No. 11-2503, 2013 WL 240983,
at *2 (Vet. App. Jan. 23, 2013) (“[The benefit of the doubt] doctrine applies not when
there is any possible doubt, but only when the evidence is in equipoise.”). Multiple
cases merely cite Ortiz favorably for its discussion on equipoise of the evidence. See
Webb v. Shinseki, No. 12-3078, 2013 WL 57755662, at *4 (Vet. App. Oct. 24, 2013)
(“[T]he benefit of the doubt doctrine has ‘no application where the Board determines
that the preponderance of the evidence weighs against the veteran’s claim’ or when
the evidence is not in ‘equipoise.’” (citing Ortiz v. Principi (citation omitted))); Enos
v. Gibson, No. 13-0721, 2014 WL 3475102, at *3 (Vet. App. Jul. 16, 2014) (relying on
Ortiz for its discussion of equipoise of the evidence); Talley v. Shinseki, No. 13-2490,
2014 WL 1810823, at *4 (Vet. App. May 8, 2014) (same); Wall v. Shinseki, No. 13-0189,
2014 WL 1016219, at *5 (Vet. App. Mar. 18, 2014) (same); Wathen v. Shinseki, No. 121650, 2014 WL 438309, at *2 (Vet. App. Feb. 5, 2014) (same).
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II. LIMITING FACT-FINDING AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR AT THE
VETERANS COURT
In Tadlock v. McDonough,70 the Federal Circuit limited the Veterans
Court’s power to fact-find and narrowed its power to find prejudicial
error.71 In 1988, President Ronald Reagan finalized the creation of the
Veterans Court by signing the VJRA into law.72 The Federal Circuit
noted that “VA stood in splendid isolation as the single federal
administrative agency whose major functions were explicitly insulated
from judicial review” before the VJRA specifically subjected VA to
judicial review.73 While discussions about the creation of a court to
review VA’s decisions began in the 1950s,74 there were several concerns
about introducing judicial review to the veterans benefits process.75
Among these concerns were fears that introducing judicial review to
the practice would bring more attorneys into the VA process who
might bilk unsuspecting veterans out of their guaranteed benefit

70. 5 F.4th 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
71. Id. at 1337–38.
72. See Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 301, 102 Stat. 4105,
4113 (1988) (“There is hereby established, under Article I of the Constitution of the
United States, a court of record to be known as the United States Court of Veterans
Appeals.”).
73. Gardner v. Brown, 5 F.3d 1456, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The court cited provisions of a House report that examined proposed
changes to Title 38 of the U.S. Code, including changes to 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) as
follows:
On and after October 17, 1940, except as provided in sections 775, 784, and
as to matters arising under chapter 37 of this title, the decisions of the
Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by
the Veterans’ Administration providing benefits for veterans and their
dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official or
any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any
such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.
H.R. Rep. No. 100-963, pt. 1, at 54 (1988).
74. Lawrence B. Hagel & Michael P. Horan, Five Years Under the Veterans’ Judicial
Review Act: The VA is Brought Kicking and Screaming into the World of Meaningful Due
Process, 46 ME. L. REV. 43–45 (1994).
75. Id. at 45–46 (“It is clear that there was concern that with it, judicial review
would bring unnecessary formalism to the claims adjudication process.”).
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monies.76 There was also a fear that judicial review would lead to a delay
in adjudicating veterans’ claims for benefits.77
Given these concerns, Congress crafted jurisdictional limits for the
Veterans Court’s review of Board of Veterans’ Appeals decisions.78
Specifically, Congress expressed that the Veterans Court has
jurisdictional authority to do the following: (1) “decide all relevant
questions of law”; (2) “interpret constitutional, statutory, and
regulatory provisions”; (3) “determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an action of the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs]”; (4)
“compel action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed”; (5) “hold unlawful and set aside decisions, findings . . . ,
conclusions, rules, and regulations adopted by the Secretary [or BVA]”
that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,” “contrary to
constitutional right,” or “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority,
or limitations,” among other things; and (6) “hold unlawful and set
aside or reverse [] finding[s]” of material fact made by VA that are
“clearly erroneous.”79
76. S. 11, The Proposed Veterans’ Administration Adjudication Procedure and
Judicial Review Act, and S. 2292, Veterans’ Judicial Review Act: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 100th Cong. 175 (1988) (statement of Sen. John Kerry).
77. See, e.g., id. at 493, 500 (statement of Donald L. Ivers, General Counsel,
Veterans Administration) (articulating concerns that the new adversarial system would
make the processing of claims more burdensome and that caseloads could increase
dramatically, both of which could cause delays); id. at 603 (statement of Disable
American Veterans) (echoing the general concern that judicial review would cause
significant delays); id. at 333–34 (statement of Honorable Morris S. Arnold and
Honorable Stephen G. Breyer, on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United
States) (expressing concern for judicial review because “[a]ny such litigation in the
courts would be expensive and fraught with delay”); id. at 568 (statement of Jerry L.
Mashaw, Professor of Law at Yale Law School) (describing how attorney behavior in
response to judicial review would delay claims).
78. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a). See generally Laurence R. Helfer, The Politics of Judicial
Structure: Creating the United States Court of Veterans Appeals, 25 CONN. L. REV. 155, 167–
70 (1992) (providing an overview of the final judicial structure of the VJRA and the
underlying political justifications for its structure); Barton F. Stichman, The Veterans’
Judicial Review Act of 1988: Congress Introduces Courts and Attorneys to Veterans’ Benefits
Proceedings, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 506 (1989) (providing a broad overview of the
congressional changes implemented in the VJRA).
79. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a) (2018). The “clearly erroneous” standard differs slightly
from the Administrative Procedures Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard applied
to questions of fact. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018); see, e.g., Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490
U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (requiring a reviewing court that applies the arbitrary and
capricious standard to “consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of
the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgement”).

2022]

REVIEW OF VETERANS LAW DECISIONS

1635

When exercising judicial review, Congress strictly prohibited de
novo fact-finding by the Veterans Court.80 This prohibition on first
instance fact-finding represented one of Congress’s concessions to the
concerns of judicial review:
In questions of fact, . . . the VA had particular expertise in gathering
relevant information through its use of medical, legal, and
occupational experts, while courts were comparatively less equipped
to decide such matters. Perhaps more significantly, factual review
would cause the [Board] and VA to rely on substantially more
complex rationales to justify their decisions. With greater complexity
and a more formalized decision-making structure would also come
increased reliance on attorneys . . . .81

In addition to requiring that the Veterans Court’s decisions must “be
[up]on the record of proceedings before the Secretary and the
Board,”82 Congress required the Veterans Court to “take due account
of the rule of prejudicial error” in each case.83 The Supreme Court
found this prejudicial error analysis to be the same review undertaken
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),84 which the
Court previously determined requires a review of the “administrative
record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the
reviewing court.”85 Indeed, if the agency record does not support an
agency finding, “the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to
remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation. The
reviewing court is not generally empowered to conduct a de
novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own
conclusions based on such an inquiry.”86
Over the past thirty years of judicial review of VA’s decision-making,
the Federal Circuit often reminded the Veterans Court of its inability
to engage in fact-finding in the first instance.87 For example, in Hensley
v. West,88 the Federal Circuit examined a claim involving a veteran’s
lung problems and noted that for the Veterans Court to determine that
80. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c) (noting that “in no event shall findings of fact made by
the Secretary or [the Board] be subject to trial de novo by the Court”).
81. Helfer, supra note 78, at 164.
82. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(b).
83. Id. § 7261(b).
84. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 406 (2009) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706).
85. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (per curiam).
86. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985).
87. See, e.g., Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Elkins v. Gober,
229 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
88. 212 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

1636

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1619

the veteran’s lung condition occurred before exposure to toxic gas, it
must have engaged in fact-finding of a condition that the Board did
not previously address. 89 The Federal Circuit found that this factfinding in the first instance by the Veterans Court was inappropriate.90
Similarly, in Elkins v. Gober,91 the Veterans Court determined that the
Board’s conclusion that a veteran had not presented sufficient
evidence of headaches was incorrect.92 The Veterans Court went
further to find that VA still would not have granted the claim because
the veteran failed to provide evidence of a nexus between the disability
and military service; therefore, the Board’s error could not have been
prejudicial.93 On appeal to the Federal Circuit, even the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs (Secretary) agreed that this conclusion by the
Veterans Court was a result of improper fact-finding.94 The appropriate
action the Veterans Court should have taken in Elkins was to remand
the claim to the Board for continued development of the evidence and
to make a new determination regarding the nexus of the veteran’s
condition to his service.95 The Federal Circuit reminded the Veterans
Court that “[f]act-finding in veterans cases is to be done by the expert
[Board], not by the Veterans Court.”96
While the Veterans Court’s inability to engage in fact-finding in the
first instance may seem well-defined, nuances to the prohibition
continue to develop. One of these nuances is that Congress authorized
the Veterans Court to engage in factfinding to determine whether an
error committed by the Board resulted in prejudicial error to the
veteran.97 For over a decade, the Federal Circuit’s 2007 decision in
Newhouse v. Nicholson98 (Newhouse II) served as the foundation upon
which the Veterans Court interpreted its fact-finding authority in cases
involving prejudicial error.99

89. Id. at 1264.
90. Id.
91. 229 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
92. Id. at 1371.
93. Id. at 1377.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b).
98. 497 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
99. See id. at 1302–03 (concluding that the Veterans Court did not err because it
has “the statutory duty to ‘take due account of the rule of prejudicial error’ by
considering ‘the record of the proceedings before the Secretary and the Board’”).
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In Newhouse II, the Federal Circuit reviewed a Veterans Court
decision which found harmless error, even though the Board itself
found that VA failed to provide adequate notice to the veteran.100 The
Federal Circuit considered the veteran’s argument that the Veterans
Court erred when it affirmed the Board’s decision using a different
legal ground than the one relied upon by the Board.101 The veteran
premised the assertion of error on the Supreme Court’s decision in
SEC v. Chenery,102 a seminal administrative law case. The Court held that
a court reviewing an agency’s decision may not affirm on a different
reasoning than the agency used in reaching its decision.103 The Federal
Circuit ultimately concluded that this prohibition in Chenery does not
apply to the prejudicial error analysis for veterans claims because
Congress specifically authorized the Veterans Court to determine
prejudicial error in 38 U.S.C. § 7621(b)(2).104 Congress also
authorized the Veterans Court to review the entire record and did not
explicitly limit review to the facts found by the Board.105
Newhouse II launched a trend of cases which broadly interpreted the
Veterans Court’s jurisdictional power to include fact-finding in a
prejudicial error analysis. The recent Veterans Court decision in
Simmons v. Wilkie,106 affirmed by the Federal Circuit on other grounds,
demonstrates how the Veterans Court interpreted Newhouse II to bypass
statutory prohibitions on de novo review and “engage in plenary review
of the underlying facts of the [VA] decision.”107
In Simmons, the veteran argued that a VA error in his case prevented
an award of benefits.108 The Veterans Court agreed with the veteran
that the Board had made an error, but then considered whether this

100. Id. at 1300.
101. See id. (describing how the Veterans Court instead found harmless error
because the Veterans Court found that the veteran had “actual knowledge that he
needed to submit medical evidence”).
102. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
103. Id. at 196.
104. Newhouse, 497 F.3d at 1301–02 (holding that the Chenery doctrine does not
apply to the case at bar because the Veterans Court appropriately acted within the
scope of its mandate); see also 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) (Supp. V 2000) (“[T]he Court
shall . . . take due account of the rule of prejudicial error.”).
105. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) (Supp. V 2000).
106. 30 Vet. App. 267 (2018), aff'd 964 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
107. Id. at 283; see also 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c) (“In no event shall findings of fact made
by the Secretary of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals be subject to trial de novo by the
Court.”).
108. 30 Vet. App. at 275.
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error was prejudicial.109 The Veterans Court decided that, despite the
Board’s error, the veteran’s claim would not have been granted
because the veteran failed to provide proof of one of the elements of
service connection for his disability.110 Relying on Newhouse II, the
Veterans Court made this finding de novo; the Board had not
addressed the missing element of service connection at all.111 The
Veterans Court explained that it was permitted to engage in first
instance fact-finding because “[the harmless error] inquiry must go
beyond the Board’s analysis because ‘[t]he Board cannot predict every
instance in which it might be found to have committed error,’ and,
therefore, ‘cannot be expected to make specific factual findings that
might facilitate a prejudicial error analysis.’”112
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
decision but did not address any issues of fact-finding during the
determination of prejudicial error by the Veterans Court.113 In the
shadow of Newhouse II and cases like Simmons, the Federal Circuit in
Tadlock v. McDonough114 considered the Veterans Court’s fact-finding
powers during prejudicial error review.
A. Tadlock v. McDonough
In Tadlock, the veteran claimed that VA should consider the
pulmonary embolism and resulting heart attack he suffered to be
conditions presumptively caused by his service in the Persian Gulf.115
The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied his claim because pulmonary
embolism was not an undiagnosed illness—one of the permitted
categories of conditions for service connection to service in the Persian
Gulf.116 However, in doing so, the Board failed to consider an alternate
theory that allowed for a presumptive service connection for
109. Id. at 279 (“[T]he Court has a duty to consider whether the Board’s errors
prejudiced Mr. Simmons . . . .”).
110. See id. at 285 (finding that the veteran failed to establish the linkage prong of
service connection).
111. Id. at 284; see also Bd. Vet. App. 1619575, No. 12-10 110, 2016 WL 3651237 (May
13, 2016) (making no reference to the veteran’s failure to prove linkage).
112. Simmons, 30 Vet. App. at 284 (citing Vogan v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 159, 163–
64 (2010)).
113. Simmons v. Wilkie, 964 F.3d 1381, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
114. 5 F.4th 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
115. Id. at 1331.
116. Id. (“[P]ulmonary embolism, and therefore service connection based on the
law and regulations pertaining to undiagnosed illness incurred due to Persian Gulf
service is not warranted.”).
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“medically unexplained chronic multisymptom illness [(MUCMI)] . . .
defined by a cluster of signs or symptoms.”117 The Board made no
factual determinations regarding the MUCMI category of
conditions.118 Mr. Tadlock appealed to the Veterans Court arguing,
inter alia, that the Board failed to consider his pulmonary embolism
under the MUCMI provision of the statute.119
On appeal, the Veterans Court—in a single-judge opinion—
acknowledged that the Board’s determination regarding whether the
pulmonary embolism disability could be presumptively linked to the
veteran’s Gulf War service was a factual determination.120 The Veterans
Court reviews these determinations under the clearly erroneous
standard.
The Veterans Court agreed with Mr. Tadlock that the Board’s failure
to consider whether the pulmonary embolism condition was a MUCMI
was clearly erroneous.121 The Veterans Court then considered whether
the Board’s error was prejudicial to Mr. Tadlock, thus requiring a
remand.122 The Veterans Court held that Mr. Tadlock had not
presented any evidence to the Board that his pulmonary embolism was
defined by a cluster of signs or symptoms, a requisite to qualify as a
MUCMI.123 Therefore, the Veterans Court concluded the Board’s
error was not prejudicial because the claim would not have been
granted under the unconsidered provisions of the statute.124 In support
of this finding, the Court pointed to facts in the record concerning Mr.
Tadlock’s lack of embolisms for several years and the fact that his “mild
exertional intolerance and lifetime aspirin regimen are residuals of his
[embolism and heart attack] and are not shown to be indicative of a

117. Id.; 38 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(B) (2012).
118. Tadlock, 5 F.4th at 1331.
119. Id.
120. Tadlock v. Wilkie, No. 18-1160, 2019 WL 2707830, at *2 (Vet. App. June 28,
2019), denying motion for full-court review, No. 18-1160, 2020 WL 738550 (Vet. App. Feb.
14, 2020) (per curiam), vacated sub nom. Tadlock v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2021) (outlining Mr. Tadlock’s argument that “MUCMI is defined . . . as a
diagnosed illness” in the statute).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id. (“Mr. Tadlock has not pointed to anything in the record suggesting that
his PE meets these criteria.”).
124. Id.
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[qualifying condition].”125 In making these findings, the Veterans
Court did not point to any Board findings to support its holding.126
Mr. Tadlock filed a motion with the Veterans Court for a review by a
panel of judges.127 Two of the three judges determined that the
single-judge opinion should stand.128 In her dissent, Veterans Court
Judge Pietsch noted that the Veterans Court’s decision in Tadlock
represents “the latest in a recent string of aggressive prejudicial error
analyses” by the court.129 Specifically, Judge Pietsch highlighted the
Veterans Court’s decision in Simmons, which she characterized as an
instance in which the court “granted itself factfinding authority
otherwise denied to it by Congress by couching its initial factfinding in
the language of prejudicial error.”130
While Judge Pietsch’s concerns appear to be a combination of issues
addressed in Chenery and Newhouse II and the prohibition on first
instance fact-finding by the Veterans Court found in Hensley and Elkins,
her concern is clear: “the [c]ourt’s initial factfinding, unlike the
Board’s, is essentially unreviewable.”131
Mr. Tadlock then filed a motion for full-court review.132 The
Veterans Court denied this motion, noting that motions for full-court
review are not “granted unless such action is necessary to secure or
maintain uniformity of the [c]ourt’s decisions or to resolve a question
of exceptional importance.”133
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mr. Tadlock challenged the
authority of the Veterans Court to make the fact-finding determination
that his condition was not a “medically unexplained chronic
multisymptom illness . . . defined by a cluster of signs of symptoms.”134
125. Id. at *3.
126. Id. (finding the Board’s basis “erroneous” and instead finding the veteran’s
disability “doesn’t exhibit the characteristics and features of a MUCMI”).
127. Order, Tadlock v. Wilkie, No. 18-1160, slip. op. at *1 (Vet. App. Sept. 17, 2019)
(per curiam).
128. Id. at *1–2 (showing that three judges considered the motion and one
dissented).
129. Id. at *2 (Pietsch, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Tadlock v. Wilkie, No. 18-1160, 2020 WL 738550, at *1 (citing U.S. VET. APP. R.
35(c)).
133. Id. (quoting U.S. VET. APP. R. 35(c)).
134. 38 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(2)(B) (2012); see Tadlock, 5 F.4th at 1333 (“Tadlock’s
challenge here is not to the factual determination of the Veterans Court that his illness
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The Secretary of Veterans Affairs argued that Newhouse II, among other
cases, authorizes the Veterans Court to “go outside of the facts as found
by the Board” to determine if there was prejudicial error—the
Secretary thus contended that the Veterans Court’s decision was
valid.135 Mr. Tadlock argued that his case was like Hensley and that the
Veterans Court had violated Chenery when it affirmed the Board’s
decision on a different rationale than the Board had used.136
Considering Mr. Tadlock’s Chenery concerns, the Federal Circuit, in
an opinion written by Judge Linn and joined by Judges Chen and
Newman, reiterated that the Veterans Court can affirm a Board
decision based on a different legal rationale than the Board used in its
findings when “it is clear that the factual basis for such conclusion is
not open to debate and the Board on remand could not have reached
any other determination on that issue.”137
Regarding the argument that the Veterans Court is prohibited from
de novo fact-finding during its prejudicial error analysis, the Federal
Circuit began by acknowledging Newhouse II’s holding that “[i]n
reviewing the Board’s decision for prejudicial error, the Veterans
Court is not limited to considering only the facts relied on by the Board
and VA but can—and indeed must—consult the full agency record,
including facts and determinations that could support an alternative
ground for affirmance.”138 However, the Federal Circuit declined to
find that Newhouse II and its progeny stand for the premise that the
Veterans Court may engage in the prejudicial error review “unfettered
by the particular fact-findings made by VA or the Board.”139 Rather, the
Federal Circuit held that these cases merely recognize that a
prejudicial error review must be performed in every instance based
upon the record before VA.140 Specifically, the Federal Circuit
explained that a prejudicial error analysis does not allow the Veterans
Court to conduct de novo fact-finding:
While “the record of the proceedings before the Secretary and the
Board” is broader than “the facts as found by the Board,” nothing in
either case, however, requires or even suggests that considering the
was not a MUCMI, but instead to the Veterans Court’s authority to make that factdetermination in the first instance in its consideration of prejudicial error.”).
135. Tadlock, 5 F.4th at 1334.
136. Id. at 1333.
137. Id. at 1336.
138. Id. at 1334.
139. Id. at 1335.
140. Id.
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“record of the proceedings” authorizes the Veterans Court to make
findings of fact in the first instance.141

Allowing the Veterans Court to engage in first instance fact-finding
“[w]hen questions of fact are open to debate” would prevent a veteran
from presenting evidence or argument to the expert agency for an
initial decision—an outcome that Congress did not authorize.142
In light of this, the Federal Circuit held that the Veterans Court’s
prejudicial error review is limited to (1) factual findings that are
already made by VA or the Board, or (2) facts that are obvious and
undebatable in the record, even if the Board did not specifically make
these findings.143 In instances where a fact may be open to
disagreement, a remand to the Board is necessary to allow the Board
to make the finding of fact based upon the evidence in the record.144
Turning to the Veterans Court’s decision in Mr. Tadlock’s case, the
Federal Circuit found that the Veterans Court’s determination that Mr.
Tadlock’s pulmonary embolism did not qualify as a MUCMI did not
rely upon any fact-finding by VA.145 The Federal Circuit explicitly
agreed with Judge Pietsch that the Veterans Court decision “made
factual findings that the Board did not make,”146 thus, “[t]he
determination that [Mr.] Tadlock’s symptoms did not constitute [a
qualifying condition] . . . was . . . the Veterans Court’s alone”—an
example of fact-finding in the first instance prohibited by Hensley and
Elkins.147 The Federal Circuit found support for this determination not
only in the Veterans Court’s failure to point to anything in the record
to support its determination, but also its failure to assert that its factual
finding was the only possible finding that could have been made by
VA.148 Based upon the Veterans Court’s impermissible reach into factfinding, the Federal Circuit vacated the decision and remanded it for
further proceedings.149

141. Id. at 1335–36.
142. Id. at 1337.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1337–38.
145. Id. at 1338.
146. Id. at 1338, 1340; see also Order, Tadlock v. Wilkie, No. 18-1160, slip. op. at *2
(Vet. App. Sept. 17, 2019) (per curiam) (Pietsch, J., dissenting).
147. Tadlock, 5 F.4th at 1338–39.
148. See id. at 1340.
149. Id.
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B. Impact of Tadlock on Future Veterans Court Decisions
While the Federal Circuit did not explicitly refer to the Simmons case
in its Tadlock decision, the Simmons decision and its progeny are
nonetheless implicated.
A review of the case law at the Veterans Court indicates that the court
had been relying on the “exceedingly broad” language in Simmons and,
according to the Federal Circuit, an erroneous interpretation of
Newhouse II to make factual determinations that are now barred by
Tadlock.150 This type of fact-finding by the Veterans Court typifies the
Federal Circuit’s concern in Tadlock that the Veterans Court had
expanded its own ability to engage in de novo fact-finding to include
“factual findings that the Board did not make.”151
The Tadlock decision is a positive development for veterans. When
the Board makes an erroneous determination that veterans’ claims are
without merit, the Board stops making factual findings regarding other
aspects of the claims. This is quite understandable because, in the
Board’s eyes, it did not commit an error; thus, any continued factfinding would be a waste of time and resources once it determines a
claim is meritless. In these types of cases, the Veterans Court then had
the challenge of reviewing, in the first instance, many different aspects
of a veteran’s claim that were untouched by the Board’s decision. This
is exactly what occurred in Simmons.152 In such circumstances, veterans
not only had to argue legal error in the Board’s decision, but also had
to argue for a new interpretation of the facts without being able to
submit new supporting evidence to the Veterans Court. The Tadlock
decision will significantly curtail this practice.
Tadlock’s curtailing of the Veterans Court’s fact-finding capabilities
may also be a benefit to veterans by requiring more frequent remands
to the Board. On remand, veterans will have the opportunity to present
arguments, and potentially evidence, on aspects of their claims which
may have been overlooked in their first opportunity to visit the Board.
Additionally, the Board’s factual findings that impact a veteran’s claims
can be reviewed for clear error by the Veterans Court. There was no
recourse for these same findings made by the Veterans Court in a
prejudicial error review. When appealing a Board decision to the
150. See, e.g., Wait v. Wilkie, 33 Vet. App. 8, 18 (2020) (relying on Simmons to justify
the court’s authority to engage in factfinding beyond the scope of the Board’s
analysis).
151. Tadlock, 5 F.4th at 1340.
152. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.

1644

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1619

Veterans Court, the veteran, or veteran’s advocate, would be wise to
refrain from a pro forma statement that any Board error was
prejudicial. Instead, advocates should argue that once the error is
identified, a remand to the Board is required to determine the
veteran’s claim because the facts regarding certain elements or issues
remain open and debatable. Specifically, discussing—even briefly—why
the facts are debatable may be advisable in order to ensure remand or
create an appealable issue in the event of an overreach by the Veterans
Court into fact-finding.
III. SELF SERVING AFFIDAVITS MAY BE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH THE MAILBOX RULE PRESUMPTION
This past year, in Anania v. McDonough,153 the Federal Circuit
addressed the impact of a party’s affidavit regarding proper mailing
when applying the mailbox rule.154 The Federal Circuit determined
that a party’s affidavit may provide credible evidence to create a
rebuttable presumption that the mailbox rule applies, especially when
the Secretary has not challenged the credibility of the affiant.155 To give
Anania full context, it is important to understand VA’s adoption of the
mailbox rule, as well as the Board’s implicit credibility findings.
In Rios v. Nicholson,156 the Federal Circuit determined that the
common law mailbox rule applied to correspondence between VA and
a veteran.157 The mailbox rule does not create a conclusive
presumption that correspondence arrived; rather, it creates a
rebuttable presumption of that fact.158 In other words, if a veteran
mailed an appeal of a VA decision with a proper address and postage,
then VA must presume that it received the correspondence unless it
can affirmatively rebut the presumption with evidence that it did not
receive the correspondence.159 The operation of the mailbox rule is

153. 1 F.4th 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
154. Anania, 1 F.4th at 1022 (“Under the common law mailbox rule, ‘if a letter
properly directed is proved to have been either put into the post office or delivered to
the postman, it is presumed, from the known course of business in the post office
department, that it reached its destination at the regular time, and was received by the
person to whom it was addressed.’” (quoting Rios v. Nicholson, 490 F.3d 928, 930–31
(Fed. Cir. 2007))).
155. Anania, 1 F.4th at 1027.
156. 490 F.3d 928 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
157. Id. at 931–33.
158. Id. at 933.
159. Id.
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important because veterans have several deadlines in the adjudicatory
process.160 If VA failed to record receipt of a correspondence, a
veteran’s appeal may be time barred, impacting most significantly the
veteran’s effective date for his retroactive benefits.161
When assessing credibility of evidence, the Veterans Court looks to
the Board’s express and implicit fact-finding.162 A presumption exists,
provided that the Board considered all of the evidence of record in its
decisions.163 Where evidence is not specifically mentioned in a Board
decision, the presumption remains notwithstanding the omission(s).164
Following the logic applied to the presumption regarding evidence in
the record, when the Board does not find something to be incredible,
the Veterans Court may conclude that the Board made an implicit
credibility determination.165
These two concepts, the mailbox rule and implicit credibility
determinations, are intertwined in Anania.166 In February 2009, VA
issued a Rating Decision, awarding Roy Anania “a total disability rating
based on individual unemployability” with an effective date of June
2008 and an increased rating for his major depressive disorder.167
Later, in March 2009, VA issued a “statement of the case” regarding
the major depressive disorder.168 Mr. Anania appealed the Rating
Decision in September 2009 to obtain an earlier effective date.169 In
December 2009, VA denied his request for an earlier date.170 In its
denial letter, VA told Mr. Anania that he could appeal within sixty days
of the decision or within a year of the Rating Decision, whichever was
later.171

160. See generally R. PRAC. & P. U.S. CT. VET. APP. (providing procedural rules for
timely filings and motions in the Veterans Court).
161. See infra Sections V.A.–V.B (discussing the Arellano and Taylor cases).
162. See Miller v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 249, 252 (2020) (describing the court’s
approach of reviewing the Board’s express factual determinations, then reviewing the
Board’s implicit factual determinations).
163. Id. at 260.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Anania v. McDonough, 1 F.4th 1019, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
167. See id. at 1020–21 (explaining that VA raised Anania’s rating to fifty percent
based on his condition).
168. Id. at 1021.
169. Id.
170. See id. (“As such, Mr. Anania had until March 3, 2010—one year after the date
of mailing of the notification of the VA’s decision—to file a substantive appeal . . . .”).
171. Id.
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In June 2012, Mr. Anania’s attorney submitted a letter to the Board
requesting confirmation that it had docketed Mr. Anania’s appeal.172
The attorney included a copy of the substantive appeal as an exhibit.173
In March 2013, the Board issued a decision, concluding that Mr.
Anania failed to timely file an appeal.174 Mr. Anania appealed to the
Veterans Court, and it remanded for further adjudication.175 On
remand, VA found that the presumption of regularity176 was applicable,
and that since there was no file in the computer system, the appeal was
not timely received.177 Mr. Anania again appealed to the Board
requesting that it consider and apply the mailbox rule.178 Included in
the evidence was a signed affidavit from Mr. Anania’s counsel stating
that he mailed a substantive appeal to the proper office on December
4, 2009, which would have been timely.179
The Board again determined that Mr. Anania’s appeal was not timely
filed.180 Mr. Anania appealed the case to the Veterans Court, and the
court ordered yet another remand because the Board failed to explain
why the affidavit was insufficient to trigger the mailbox rule.181 On this
second remand from the Veterans Court, the Board found that the
mailbox rule presumption did not attach because counsel’s affidavit
was “no more than self-serving testimony.”182
The Veterans Court affirmed.183 In a memorandum decision, the
Veterans Court looked to Fithian v. Shinseki,184 in which the court found
that a sworn affidavit was not sufficient to establish the presumption of
receipt under the common law mailbox rule.185 The Veterans Court
further looked to Rios and determined that the appellant must provide

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 1021 & n.1 (stating the presumption of regularity assumes that
government officials have properly discharged their official duties).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1021–22.
180. Id. at 1022.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 24 Vet. App. 146 (2010).
185. Anania v. Wilkie, No. 18-0180, 2019 WL 3436604, at *2 (Vet. App. July 31, 2019)
(citing Fithian, 24 Vet. App. at 151), rev’d sub nom. Anania v. McDonough, 1 F.4th 1019
(Fed. Cir. 2021).
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evidence demonstrating that his filing was properly addressed,
stamped, and mailed with adequate time to reach the recipient.186
Here, the Veterans Court agreed with the Board in its finding that
counsel’s affidavit was merely self-serving and was not sufficient
evidence for the presumption of receipt to attach.187
On appeal, the Federal Circuit looked to the common law mailbox
rule and analyzed whether self-serving affidavits are sufficient.188 The
Federal Circuit looked to other circuits for guidance as well.189 The
court found that the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
acknowledge that self-serving affidavits suffice to establish the
presumption of receipt.190 The Federal Circuit rejected the Veterans
Court’s rule that self-serving affidavits are per se insufficient to
establish the presumption under the mailbox rule.191 In the opinion,
Judge Stoll found that it was “inappropriate to apply an artificially rigid
approach to the assessment of evidence on the factual question of
mailing in the area of veterans benefits law given the absence of a
statute commanding such a rule and the pro-claimant, nonadversarial
nature of the statutory scheme created by Congress.”192
The Federal Circuit also looked to the Secretary’s position on the
credibility of the attorney’s statement.193 VA never challenged the
attorney’s credibility and never asserted that the attorney did not
properly address or mail the appeal.194 Instead, VA argued that the
attorney’s affidavit was inconclusive as to whether the document was
actually sent, since it was “insufficient to establish proof of mailing by
circumstantial evidence of mailings and practices.”195 The court found
that his affidavit was not conclusory and demonstrated that he mailed
the appeal in adequate time to reach VA.196
Anania has two important takeaways: first, representatives, such as
VSOs, attorneys, and agents, can play a substantive role to ensure that

186. Anania, 2019 WL 3436604, at *2.
187. Id. at *3.
188. Anania, 1 F.4th at 1022.
189. Id. at 1024–26 (examining cases from the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1027.
192. Id. at 1026.
193. Id. at 1027–28.
194. Id. at 1027.
195. Id. at 1028.
196. Id.
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veterans’ due process rights are protected, and second, the Board must
explicitly find that an affidavit lacks credibility to rebut the mailbox
rule presumption.
As a matter of best practice, when a representative assists her client
with an appeal, the representative should keep a clear record of when
the appeal was submitted and by what means it was done. Although
many representatives now rely on the “direct upload” tool available
through VA’s electronic system, representatives should keep their own
record of submission. By keeping a record, the representative can
satisfy the mailbox rule.
When reviewing a Board decision, it is important to determine what
explicit and implicit findings of fact were made by the Board.
Specifically, if the Board does not explicitly find that a piece of
evidence lacks credibility, the representative should assume the Board
found the evidence credible.197 These findings can be quite important
to ensure that a veteran is fairly treated throughout the process,
including at the Veterans Court and on remand.
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CLARIFIES THE EXTENT OF THE
CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION DOCTRINE
In Euzebio v. McDonough,198 the Federal Circuit expanded the
constructive possession doctrine to VA-contracted medical reports.199
The doctrine of constructive possession in veterans benefits law is
based on Bell v. Derwinski.200 The doctrine is important because the
Veterans Court is statutorily restricted from reviewing any document
that is not part of the record before the agency.201 Under Bell, courts
197. It is important to note that Anania is a legacy case and new rules bind the Board
under the Appeals Modernization Act. Specifically, 38 C.F.R. § 20.801(a) binds the
Board to any favorable findings identified by Regional Office or a previous Board
decision unless rebutted by clear and unmistakable evidence. The regulation
specifically defines findings as conclusions on questions of fact and application of law
to facts made by an adjudicator concerning the issue under review. It is unclear
whether implicit findings by the Board will be treated as favorable findings, including
credibility findings.
198. 989 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
199. Id. at 1309.
200. 2 Vet. App. 611 (1992) (per curiam).
201. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252(b) (“Review in the Court shall be on the record of
proceedings before the Secretary and the Board. The extent of the review shall be
limited to the scope provided in section 7261 of this title. The Court may not review
the schedule of ratings for disabilities adopted under section 1155 of this title or any
action of the Secretary in adopting or revising that schedule.”).
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will find constructive possession when the evidence is “within the
Secretary’s control and could reasonably be expected to be a part of
the record ‘before the Secretary and the Board,’” and is constructively
part of the administrative record.202 This means that if the record
before the agency does not actually include a document within the file,
the document is nonetheless considered in the analysis and on appeal.
In Bell, the VA claim file did not include three documents created by
VA itself relating to the veteran and one document submitted by the
veteran to VA during the adjudication of his claim.203 Fortunately, the
veteran’s widow had copies of the documents, which her advocate
argued should be considered part of the record.204 Because these
documents should have been in the file, and the Secretary did not
contest their genuineness, the Veterans Court held that the record
should include the submitted material. The Veterans Court remanded
the case back to the Board.205
Following Bell, veterans argued that medical reports prepared by the
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NAS)
should be considered part of the record and urged the Veterans Court
to apply the doctrine of constructive possession to these reports.206 For
example, in Monzingo v. Shinseki,207 the veteran argued that a noise
study prepared by NAS, which supported his hearing loss claim, should
be considered part of the record.208 In Monzingo, the Veterans Court
declined to find that the constructive possession doctrine applied,
stating it did not believe the NAS reports had a “direct relationship” to
the veteran’s claim.209 The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal,
202. Bell, 2 Vet. App. at 613.
203. See id. at 612 (“(1) a VA Form 119 Report of Contact, dated March 8, 1988, and
completed by Dr. Robert A. Kreisberg, a VA physician and Chief of Medical Services;
(2) a letter, dated October 3, 1988, from Dr. Joel D. Silverberg, Chief Medical Resident
and Instructor in Medicine, 1988–89, at the VA Medical Center in Birmingham,
Alabama . . .; (3) a letter from the VA to appellant informing her that the VA had
received her application and that she did not have to take any additional action at that
time . . . .”).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 612–13.
206. See, e.g., Monzingo v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 97, 100 (2012) (per curiam)
(explaining a veteran’s argument to the Veterans Court that two NAS reports were
“constructively in the Board’s possession”).
207. 26 Vet. App. 97 (2012) (per curiam), appeal dismissed sub nom., Monzingo v.
Gibson, 566 F. App’x 972 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
208. Id. at 101 (noting that the veteran relied on “select findings from Noise and
Military Service and Tinnitus”).
209. Id. at 102.
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finding it did not have jurisdiction because the appeal involved
applying facts to the law, which is precluded by the Federal Circuit’s
scope of review.210
In Euzebio, the Federal Circuit determined it had jurisdiction to hear
the case because it was reviewing a question of law, to wit: the scope of
the constructive possession doctrine. This legal question was presented
in the context of NAS Agent Orange health reports.211
A. History of Agent Orange Claims
During the Vietnam War, the United States widely used Agent
Orange as a defoliant.212 Following a National Institutes of Health
Report in 1969, the government restricted the use of Agent Orange.213
Thereafter, Vietnam veterans and their families filed a class action suit
in 1979, seeking damages for injuries and deaths relating to Agent
Orange exposure.214
Due to “concern . . . about the decision making process within the
[VA] with respect to Agent Orange compensation,” Congress enacted
the Dioxin Act,215 which sought to ensure that VA disability
compensation was provided to veterans with service-connected
disabilities from Agent Orange exposure “based on sound scientific
and medical evidence[.]”216 In 1985, VA promulgated a regulation for
the Dioxin Act that concluded: “‘[s]ound scientific and medical
evidence d[id] not establish a cause and effect relationship between
dioxin exposure’ and any disease except chloracne.”217
210. Monzingo v. Gibson, 566 F. App’x at 976; see also 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) (2018)
(expressly limiting the Federal Circuit’s ability to review “determination[s] as to a
factual matter”).
211. Euzebio v. McDonough, 989 F.3d 1305, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
212. Id. at 1309–10 (quoting S. Rep. No. 100-439, at 64 (1988)).
213. Id. at 1310. The government restricted the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam to
“‘areas remote from population,’ and from ‘1970 to 1971, the use of herbicides was
phased out.’” Id.
214. Id. See generally In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange I), 597 F.
Supp. 740, 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent
Orange II), 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing the class action litigation for
Vietnam veterans who came into contact with Agent Orange).
215. Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1311 (citing Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure
Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984)).
216. Id. at 1311 (citing Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation
Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542 § 3, 98 Stat. 2725, 2727 (1984)).
217. Id. at 1311 (citing Adjudication of Claims Based on Exposure to Dioxin or
Ionizing Radiation, 50 Fed. Reg. 34458, 34458 (Aug. 26, 1985) (codified at 38 C.F.R.
pts. 1, 3)).
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Subsequently, in 1987, Vietnam veterans brought a class action suit
against VA, alleging the regulation improperly implemented the
Dioxin Act.218 This action served as a catalyst culminating in VA’s
amendment of the Dioxin Regulation. The regulation was amended to
provide for presumptive service connection “when the relative weights
of valid positive and negative studies permit the conclusion that it is at
least as likely as not that the purported relationship between a
particular type of exposure and a specific adverse health effect
exists.”219
Following these events, Congress passed the Agent Orange Act of
1991,220 which required the Secretary “to obtain independent scientific
review of the available scientific evidence regarding associations
between diseases and exposure to dioxin and other chemical
compounds in herbicides.”221 Congress directed VA to contract with
the NAS to review, summarize, and assess the scientific evidence of an
association between Agent Orange and certain diseases.222 The statute
required NAS to transmit reports to VA at least every two years with
their findings.223
Until 2015, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs had sixty days after
receiving a NAS report to determine whether each disease contained
in the report warranted a presumption of service connection.224 If a
disease warranted the presumption, the Secretary had to issue
proposed regulations; however, if a disease did not warrant a
presumption, the Secretary only had the obligation to publish the
notice of its conclusion in the Federal Register.225 Although the Agent
Orange Act does not require VA to consider NAS reports in individual
claim adjudications, “VA is on notice as to the information contained”
within the reports.226

218. Id. at 1312.
219. Id. (citing Evaluation of Studies Relating to Health Effects of Dioxin and
Radiation Exposure, 54 Fed. Reg. 40388, 40391 (Oct. 2, 1989) (codified at 38 C.F.R.
pt. 1)).
220. Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11 (1991).
221. Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1312.
222. Id. at 1313.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1314.
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B. Euzebio v. McDonough
Robert M. Euzebio served in the U.S. Navy from February 1966 to
October 1969.227 He was exposed to Agent Orange while stationed in
Da Nang and then Hoi An.228 In 2011, Mr. Euzebio began to
experience problems swallowing, and a medical examination revealed
nodules on his thyroid.229 He sought disability compensation for his
thyroid condition based upon his exposure to Agent Orange in
Vietnam.230 VA denied his claim, finding that “[t]he available scientific
and medical evidence d[id] not support the conclusion that [his]
condition [was] associated with herbicide exposure.”231 In 2015, Mr.
Euzebio appealed VA’s decision to the Board.232
While this decision was pending, a NAS Committee published its
2014 Update which found that thyroid conditions are related to
herbicide exposure.233 In 2017, the Board denied Mr. Euzebio’s claim
despite the 2014 report.234
Mr. Euzebio appealed to the Veterans Court, arguing that the NAS
report “was constructively before the Board because the Secretary
knew of the report’s content,” and had the Board considered the
report, it would have been required to obtain a medical opinion on his
behalf before adjudicating the claim.235 The Veterans Court affirmed
the Board’s decision, concluding that “the [NAS] 2014 Update was not
constructively before the Board.”236 The Veterans Court reasoned that,
“even if VA is aware of a [NAS] report . . . that [knowledge alone] is
insufficient to trigger the constructive possession doctrine; there must
also be a direct relationship to the claim on appeal.”237 Veterans Court
227. Id.
228. Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 1116 (a)(1)(B) (establishing a presumption of Agent
Orange exposure based on service in the Republic of Vietnam from 1962 to 1975).
229. Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1315.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See id. (explaining that the findings of the updated report published by “the
NAS Committee to Review the Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans Exposure to
Herbicides”).
234. See id. at 1316 (finding that the veteran’s thyroid disability was not “related to
his in-service environmental exposure”).
235. Id.; see also Euzebio v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 394, 397 (2019) (providing details
of the veteran’s argument in front of the Veterans Court).
236. Euzebio, 31 Vet. App. at 397.
237. Id. at 402 (determining that knowledge alone is insufficient even if the report
“contains general information about the type of disability on appeal”).
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Judge Allen dissented, interpreting the majority’s rationale to be
“constructive ignorance rather than a constructive possession
doctrine.”238
Mr. Euzebio then appealed to the Federal Circuit where a panel
reviewed the Veterans Court decision.239 Mr. Euzebio argued the
Veterans Court “relied on an erroneous legal standard when it refused
to consider the [NAS Update 2014] because it lacked a ‘direct
relationship’ to [his] claim.”240
In an opinion by Judge Wallach, the Federal Circuit detailed the
legal history of constructive possession, starting with the Veterans
Court’s decision in Bell.241 The Federal Circuit believed the narrow
interpretation of the constructive possession doctrine applied by the
Veterans Court in Euzebio (and an earlier decision, Monzingo) was
erroneous.242
The Federal Circuit found that “[r]equiring that evidence bear a
‘direct relationship’ or be ‘specific to’ the veteran for constructive
possession is without basis in relevant statute or regulation . . .
untethered from statutory and regulatory standard.”243 The Court
instead found that the correct standard for constructive possession is
“relevance and reasonableness.”244 The Federal Circuit stated that it
was “undisputed” that the NAS issued its report prior to Mr. Euzebio’s
Board decision, that VA (and therefore the Board) knew of the NAS
Report at the time of the appeal, and that the NAS Report was
important and relevant to Agent Orange claims.245 Accordingly, the
Court held:
[If the Board] has constructive or actual knowledge of evidence that
is “relevant and reasonably connected” to the veteran’s claim, but

238. See Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1317 (citing Euzebio v. Wilkie, at 409 (Allen, J.,
dissenting)) (characterizing the lower court’s dissent, in which the dissenting judge
stated that the majority’s opinion could not “possibly be the outcome of a rational
system of adjudication, especially one designed to be pro-veteran and
nonadversarial”).
239. Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1317.
240. Id. at 1319.
241. Id. (citing Bell v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 611 (1992) (per curiam)).
242. Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1319.
243. Id. at 1320.
244. See id. at 1321 (“The relevancy limitation allows VA to focus its efforts on
obtaining documents that have a reasonable possibility of assisting claimants in
substantiating their claims for benefits.” (citing Golz v. Shinseki, 590 F.3d 1317, 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2010))).
245. Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1320.
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nonetheless fails to consider that evidence . . . the Veterans Court
must ensure that Board and VA decisions are not “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law” . . . and remand for further consideration or explanation
where appropriate.246

The Federal Circuit proceeded to analyze the Secretary’s remaining
arguments and the Veterans Court’s concerns, finding each of them
misguided.247 The Court examined the “record rule” and acknowledged
that judicial review should be based on the record, as required by
statute.248 Because the intent of the rule is to ensure that new evidence is
not used to convert the Veterans Court’s judicial review into de novo
factual considerations on subsequent appeal,249 the court allowed that
where the record before the agency is “insufficient to permit meaningful
judicial review, . . . extra-record evidence” may be considered by the
court.250
Further, the Federal Circuit explained that the Veterans Court
misapplied the rule from Kyhn v. Shinseki251 when it failed to consider
“extra-record” evidence in its review of Board decisions.252 While Kyhn
held that the Veterans Court could not rely upon “extra-record”
evidence to make a factual finding in the first instance, the court was
not precluded from taking judicial notice of “extra-record” evidence
in its review of agency decisions.253
The Federal Circuit also disagreed with the Secretary’s argument
that “direct relationship” and “relevance” were essentially the same
standard.254 “Direct relationship” required the evidence to be specific
246. Id. at 1321 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A)).
247. See Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1321–23 (analyzing the statutes and cases VA relied on
and disagreeing with VA’s and lower court’s interpretations).
248. See id. at 1322 (recognizing that the record rule limits the scope of judicial
review, but also noting that the rule “is not without exceptions”); see also 38 U.S.C.
§ 7252(b) (“Review in the Court shall be on the record of proceedings before the
Secretary and the Board. The extent of the review shall be limited to the scope
provided in section 7261.”).
249. See Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1322 (“The record rule’s ‘purpose . . . is to guard against
courts using new evidence to convert the arbitrary and capricious standard into
effectively de novo review’ . . . .” (quoting Axiom Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 564
F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009))).
250. Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1322 (citing Axiom Res. Mgmt., Inc., 564 F.3d at 1381).
251. 716 F.3d 572 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
252. Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1323.
253. Id. (citing Kyhn, 716 F.3d at 576, 578).
254. See Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1324 (finding the Secretary’s argument “facially
incorrect”).
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to the veteran, while “relevance” required evidence to tend to prove,
or disprove, a material fact.255
The Federal Circuit then responded to the Secretary’s argument
that the NAS report was not “relevant,” and clarified that the Veterans
Court was the proper forum to address questions of whether the Board
had constructive possession of the report. It found that the Veterans
Court should determine, using the correct legal standard, whether the
report was relevant such that the constructive possession doctrine
would apply.256 The court further clarified that the Board was
responsible for determining whether a NAS report triggers the need
to administer a medical examination under VA’s duty to assist.257
Finally, in addressing the Secretary’s contention that the Secretary
would face an “unworkable standard” and “impossible burden,” if VA
adjudicators’ jobs included reviewing reports like the one at issue, the
court remarked: “[a]s an initial matter, it is unclear what the
Government believes VA adjudicators are meant to do if not evaluate
and draw conclusions from record evidence to discern its impact on
individual cases.”258 Additionally, the Federal Circuit noted that VA
already requires adjudicators to consider NAS reports in some cases
and, further, that “relevance and reasonableness” are already wellestablished standards for VA review.259 As a final reminder, the court
reiterated the “pro-claimant” nature of the system, that “[t]he
government’s interest in veterans cases is not that it shall win, but
rather that justice shall be done, that all veterans so entitled receive
the benefits due to them.”260
C. Impact of Euzebio
The implications arising from Euzebio are far-reaching in terms of
Board policy, procedure, and advocacy.
First, with regard to Board policy, it is important to note the Federal
Circuit cited to the “Purplebook” in its opinion, explaining that the
Purplebook required review of NAS reports in certain cases.261 The
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1324; see also McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79, 86
(2006) (explaining the standard to determine whether a claim requires a medical
examination).
258. Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1324.
259. Id. at 1321.
260. Id. (citing Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
261. See Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1316–17, 1320.
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Board created the Purplebook to consolidate various internal
procedures, effective March 23, 2018.262 Sixteen days after the Euzebio
opinion was issued, the Chairman of the Board suspended use of the
Purplebook “ex post facto.”263
It will be interesting to see whether the Board’s abandonment of the
Purplebook “ex post facto” alters the applicability of the constructive
possession doctrine when it comes to NAS reports. Setting aside the
question of whether the Chairman of the Board has the authority to
abandon its own operating document “ex post facto,” the gist of the
constructive possession doctrine is whether it is reasonable to conclude
that VA was aware of the document at the time it adjudicated the claim.
Whether mentioned in the Purplebook or otherwise, VA receives NAS
reports through its contract with NAS, and it should not matter
whether internal operating manuals refer to their existence. As
explained in Euzebio, citing Veterans Court Judge Allen’s dissent:
The importance and relevance of the NAS Reports to Agent Orange
claims are well-known and well-established—they are the result of
decades of veteran engagement, . . . and of congressional
investigation and legislation . . . [t]he NAS Reports exist, by
congressional mandate, to give VA necessary “independent scientific
review of the available scientific evidence regarding associations
between diseases and exposure to dioxin and other chemical
compounds in herbicides[.]” . . . A constructive possession doctrine
that allows an administrative judge to “‘ignore [an NAS Report] she
knows exists’ and knows ‘contains important . . . information,’”
cannot “possibly be the outcome of a rational system of adjudication,
especially one designed to be pro-veteran and non-adversarial.”264

The impact of Euzebio is not limited to the precise facts at issue in the
case. Mr. Euzebio’s disability related to his thyroid. But for as many as
160,000 Vietnam veterans, like many other Americans, hypertension is
a diagnosed disability.265 VA estimates that adopting a presumptive
service connection for hypertension will cost up to fifteen billion
262. OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, NO. 01-21-06, FORMAL RECISSION
PURPLEBOOK (2021), https://www.va.gov/FOIA/docs/updated_Documents/
BVA/Memo_No_01_21_06.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7SP-Y36V].
263. Id.
264. Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1320–21 (citing Euzebio v. Wilke, 31 Vet. App. 394, 409
(2019) (Allen, J., dissenting)).
265. Abbie Bennett, Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Extend VA Care to 490,000 More
Veterans Ill from Agent Orange, CONNECTING VETS (Mar. 18, 2021, 3:00 AM),
https://www.audacy.com/connectingvets/news/politics/bill-expands-va-benefits-forhypertension-from-agent-orange [https://perma.cc/DW3A-BJ25].
OF THE
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dollars, and VA has opposed efforts to legislate such a presumption,
asserting the need for more scientific analysis.266
Indeed, NAS has been studying hypertension, “sponsored” by VA.267
In 2018, NAS found “sufficient” evidence of a link between
hypertension and Agent Orange, moving hypertension up from its
earlier classification of “limited or suggestive” association.268 These
classifications provide the scientific basis upon which to place a disease
on the presumptive list; the “sufficient” classification means there is a
“positive association” between the disease and Agent Orange.269
As noted above, prior to 2015, VA was required to engage in timely
rulemaking when these positive associations were found.270 This
obligation no longer exists by statute.271 At the time of this writing,
hypertension is not on the Agent Orange presumptive list, despite
NAS’s conclusion. Veterans advocates should cite the NAS report early
and often in claims involving hypertension, to properly make the
record.
When it comes to VA procedure, constructive possession of NAS
reports has ripple effects. Euzebio reminds the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs that even when VA has not conceded a presumptive connection,
the statutory “duty to assist” requires VA to send a veteran for a medical
examinations when the evidence “may” suggest the disability is related
to service.272 Given NAS’s 2018 findings that concluded there is
“sufficient” evidence of a link between hypertension and Agent
Orange, it appears, under Euzebio, that the Veterans Court must find
error if VA does not provide an adequate medical exam in the face of
a Vietnam veteran’s hypertension claim.273 More to the point, VA
medical exams must be reviewed carefully to ensure that the medical
266. See id.
267. See, e.g., Vietnam Veterans and Agent Orange Exposure-New Report, NASAS (Nov. 15,
2018),
www.nationalacademies.org/news/2018/11/vietnam-veterans-and-agentorange-exposure-new-report [https://perma.cc/VBR5-U58B] (explaining the studies
positive association cannot be determinately proven because there are “chance, bias,
and confounding factors [that] could not be ruled out with confidence”).
268. Id.
269. See id.
270. 38 U.S.C. § 1116(a)(1)(B).
271. § 1116(e).
272. Euzebio, 989 F.3d at 1325 (citing 38 USC § 5103A(d)).
273. See supra notes 224–26 and accompanying text (referencing that VA will review
NAS Updates but is not mandated to consider them); see also Vietnam Veterans and Agent
Orange Exposure-New Report, supra note 267 (noting hypertension rates were significantly
higher for veterans who were likely exposed to herbicides).
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rationale is adequate and complete.274 Further, since the Veterans
Court addresses the adequacy of VA medical exams, veterans advocates
can make a strong argument to the Court that any medical exam is
inadequate if it does not mention the “positive association” between
hypertension and Agent Orange in the 2018 NAS report. The
adequacy of VA medical exams is often addressed by the Veterans
Court.
Finally, in terms of future advocacy, Euzebio, as well as Bell and its
progeny, did not limit the applicability of the constructive possession
doctrine to NAS reports. Indeed, the parameters of what is
“reasonably” in VA’s possession is a ripe area to explore. At one end of
the spectrum, at least one Board of Veterans Appeals Judge has
explained: “[t]he Board strives for consistency in issuing its decisions,
while noting that previously issued Board decisions are considered
binding only with regard to the specific case decided. . . . Nevertheless,
prior decisions in other appeals may be considered in a case to the
extent that they reasonably relate to the case.”275
Does the openness to considering other related Board decisions,
expressed by at least one Board of Veterans Appeals judge, mean the
Board must analyze and research all similar decisions when
adjudicating every individual claim because of the constructive
possession doctrine? Whether this is reasonable will be tested in the
future in light of Euzebio. In this regard, the volume of the Board’s work
may come into play: the 2020 Chairman’s Report states that
approximately 100 Veterans Law Judges issued 102,663 decisions in
2020 alone.276 However, somewhere between “all related Board
decisions” and NAS reports, other documents exist which are highly
probative when it comes to a veteran’s claim. Is it unreasonable to
expect VA, which adjudicates in a nonadversarial and paternalistic
system, to adjudicate claims based on its own institutional knowledge,
as expressed and found in earlier Board decisions?

274. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303,311 (2007), abrogated on sep. grounds by
Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331, 1338 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Stefl v. Nicholson,
21 Vet. App. 120, 124 (2007) (“[T]he medical opinion . . . must support its conclusion
with an analysis that the Board can consider and weigh.”).
275. See, e.g., No. 12-24 264A, 2015 WL 1601595, at *2 (Vet. App. Feb. 5, 2015)
(explaining the presence of previously released information regarding herbicide
exposure creates an inference that may be considered in a veteran’s claims).
276. BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., ANN. REP. FISCAL YEAR (FY)
2020 6, 14.
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Consider an example: a veteran, “J.D.”, served in Okinawa, Japan
during the Vietnam War as a military police officer. The veteran suffers
from a panoply of disabilities found on the Agent Orange presumptive
list. However, neither VA nor the Department of Defense (DoD)
concede Agent Orange was used in Okinawa during the Vietnam War.
The VA Regional Office denies J.D.’s claim for Agent Orange related
disabilities because it determines Agent Orange was not used in
Okinawa. On appeal to the Board, J.D. cites the Board to its earlier
decision in Case Number 21053446 (“No. 446”).277 In No. 446, the
Board made an express “finding of fact” that the evidence “is in relative
equipoise as to whether herbicide agents were used in Okinawa.”278 As
a result of this finding, the Board service-connected J.D.’s Agent
Orange disabilities. In reaching the finding of fact that Agent Orange
was used in Okinawa, the Board of Veterans Appeals judge in No. 446
cited articles from the South China Morning and the Asia-Pacific
Journal.279 The judge also cited several DoD documents supporting the
fact Agent Orange was used in Okinawa.280
Given this situation, it seems reasonable that J.D.’s claim must be
granted if J.D.’s advocate cites No. 446 to VA. If the factual evidence
supporting the finding of Agent Orange supported granting the claim
in No. 446, why would the factual evidence relating to the use of Agent
Orange be any different for J.D?
The question of whether J.D. should prevail in the absence of an able
advocate is yet another Euzebio-related question. Must VA employees
search the Board Decision database (which exists on the Board of
Veterans Appeals website and is easily accessible by a Boolean search)?
In the non-adversarial, paternalistic system, where the doctrine of
constructive possession applies, is it really a stretch to ask VA to do a
word search in its own database of decisions before it decides a
veteran’s claim?
A robust use of the constructive possession doctrine should lead to
fewer appeals to the Veterans Court and quicker resolutions for
veterans who have legitimate claims documented in analogous
decisions or the subject of updated scientific studies. Euzebio will have
a long-lasting impact in the development of veterans’ benefits law.

277.
278.
279.
280.

No. 15-14 318, 2021 WL 4723800, at *1 (Vet. App. Aug. 30, 2021).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
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Advocates should stay abreast of NAS updates, as well as analogous
Board decisions.
V. EQUITABLE TOLLING & EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
In 2021, the Federal Circuit dealt with the extent to which general
fairness considerations impact statutory interpretation. Two cases
squarely addressed the equitable powers of the Veterans Court. In
Arellano v. McDonough,281 the Federal Circuit reviewed whether a statute
limiting the effective date of claims for disability compensation
benefits was subject to equitable tolling.282 In Taylor v. McDonough,283
the court considered whether the Veterans Court has the power to
apply equitable estoppel.284 The final resolution of the issues raised in
both of these cases will turn on an upcoming Supreme Court decision;
on February 22, 2022, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to Mr. Arellano.285 That same day, the Federal Circuit issued
an order staying the outcome of Taylor v. McDonough pending the
Supreme Court’s disposition in Arellano v. McDonough.286 We offer a
brief background to these cases below.
In each of these cases, the veteran suffered from a disability resulting
from his time in service and sought payment of retroactive benefits to
a time earlier than the date VA found as the “effective date” of his
claim.287 Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5110, the effective date for VA benefits
is typically the date a veteran submits an application for benefits,
although there are several statutory exceptions.288 The effective date
can affect the beginning of payments for a veteran’s disability and his
or her entitlement to specific benefits, such as educational
assistance.289 Often these “retroactive payments” can constitute tens of
thousands of dollars.

281. 1 F.4th 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
282. Id. at 1060.
283. 3 F.4th 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2021), vacated and reh’g granted, 4 F.4th 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2021) (per curiam).
284. Taylor, 3 F.4th at 1355–56.
285. Arellano v. McDonough, No. 21-432, 2022 WL 515866, at *1 (U.S. Feb. 22,
2022).
286. Taylor v. McDonough, Fed. Cir. R. (Order, 19-2211 (2021)).
287. See Taylor, 3 F.4th at 1359; see also Arellano, 1 F.4th at 1063.
288. See 38 U.S.C. § 5110 (detailing the various exceptions that impact the date of
an applicant’s benefits, including special situations for child dependency,
supplemental claims, and disability compensation).
289. See id. §§ 5110, 5113.
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The underlying facts impacting the effective date for the benefits in
the cases discussed below vary. In Arellano, the veteran’s disability
caused the delay in his application for benefits.290 In Taylor, the
government directly prevented the veteran from seeking benefits
through a nondisclosure agreement.291 Each of these situations gave
rise to equitable arguments supporting an earlier effective date.
A. Arellano v. McDonough—Equitable Tolling
In an en banc opinion, the Federal Circuit declined to find that
principles of equitable tolling could be applied to the effective date
considerations found in 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1), providing that if a
veteran files a claim for compensation within one year of discharge, his
effective date shall be the date of discharge.292 Mr. Arellano sought
equitable tolling based on his long period of mental illness.293
An equally divided court analyzed the question, with two groups of
six judges each issuing separate opinions concurring with the ultimate
decision that Mr. Arellano was not entitled to tolling.294 One opinion
held that equitable tolling principles do not apply to § 5110(b)(1).295
The other opinion held the doctrine was available but not applicable
under the facts presented.296 As a result of the split decision, the court’s
previous decision in Andrews v. Principi,297 which held that principles of
equitable tolling are not applicable to the time period set forth in
§ 5110(b)(1), remained intact.298
The facts of the case are as follows. Mr. Arellano filed for disability
compensation benefits in 2011, almost thirty years after discharge from

290. See Arellano, 1 F.4th at 1063.
291. Taylor, 3 F.4th at 1358.
292. See Arellano, 1 F.4th at 1093 (Dyk, J., concurring).
293. Id. at 1063 (noting Mr. Arellano argued he was one hundred percent disabled
since suffering injuries in 1980).
294. Compare id. at 1061 (Chen, J., concurring) (refusing to apply a presumption of
equitable tolling because doing so would overturn precedent, which the judges
thought would be improper since panel was equally divided), with id. at 1086 (Dyk, J.,
concurring) (determining that presumption of equitable tolling applies, but not for
the circumstances of this case).
295. Id. at 1061 (Chen, J., concurring). The judges who joined this opinion were
Judges Chen, Moore, Lourie, Prost, Taranto and Hughes. Id. at 1060.
296. Id. at 1086 (Dyk, J., concurring). The judges who joined this opinion were
Judges Dyk, Newman, O’Malley, Reyna, Wallach and Stoll. Id.
297. 351 F.3d 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
298. Arellano, 1 F.4th at 1061 (citing Andrews, 351 F.3d at 1137).
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the Navy in 1981.299 He sought compensation for “schizoaffective
disorder bipolar type with PTSD.”300 A medical opinion from a
psychiatrist confirmed his disability existed since 1980 when he was
almost crushed and swept overboard on an aircraft carrier.301 VA
awarded a one hundred percent disability rating with an effective date
of 2011.302 Mr. Arellano argued the effective date of his claim should
be decades earlier—1981—because his mental disorder prevented him
from filing for benefits from the time of his discharge until he filed his
claim in 2011.303
VA’s effective date determination was based on § 5110(a)(1), which
provides: “[u]nless specifically provided otherwise in this chapter, the
effective date . . . shall not be earlier than the date of receipt of
application.”304 One way the chapter specifically “provide[s] otherwise”
is found in § 5110(b)(1), which states that “[t]he effective date of an
award . . . shall be the day following the date of the veteran’s discharge
or release if application thereof is received within one year from such
date of discharge.”305 Mr. Arellano focused his appeal on § 5110(b)(1),
claiming it was appropriate that the time be tolled from his date of
discharge until the date he filed his claim.306
The Supreme Court precedent central to the Arellano decision was
Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs.307 In Irwin, the Supreme Court
assessed whether the wrongful discharge claim of an employee who
filed outside the required time period could proceed despite a missed

299. Arellano, 1 F.4th at 1063.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1062 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)(1)).
305. Id. at 1062 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1)).
306. Id. at 1061.
307. 498 U.S. 89 (1990); see also Arellano, 1 F.4th at 1061 (Chen, J., concurring)
(“Specifically, we consider whether the rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling for
statutes of limitations established in Irwin . . . applies to the one-year period in
§ 5110(b)(1).” (citations omitted)); id. at 1086 (Dyk, J., concurring) (“An equal
number of judges (Judges Newman, O’Malley, Reyna, Wallach, Stoll, and myself) join
this opinion and would hold that § 5110(b)(1) is a statute of limitations subject to
equitable tolling, that the Irwin presumption of equitable tolling applies, but that
§ 5110(b)(1) cannot be equitably tolled for mental disability in the circumstances of
this case.”).
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deadline.308 By statute, the employee had thirty days from receipt of
the EEOC’s notice of final action letter to file his claim.309 He filed the
claim forty-four days after his attorney’s office received the EEOC
notice because his attorney was out of the office when the notice
arrived.310 The employee argued that since the notice was sent only to
the attorney’s office and he had no knowledge of its date of receipt,
the statute should be equitably tolled.311 The Court found that statutes
of limitations in actions against the government are subject to the same
rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling that applies to suits against
private litigants.312 Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined to find that
equitable tolling should apply in favor of Mr. Irwin, as his situation was
only one of excusable neglect.313
Therefore, to follow the Irwin analysis, the Federal Circuit in Arellano
had to first determine whether § 5110(b)(1) was a statute of
limitations. Six of the judges held that it was, while the other six judges
held it was not.314
The judges that determined equitable tolling did not apply to
§ 5110(b)(1) (the “anti-tolling judges”) believed the statute did not
have the functional characteristics of a statute of limitations.315 The
“anti-tolling judges” characterized § 5110(b)(1) as only setting an
element of a benefits claim and not as an actual bar to such a claim.316
In Judge Chen’s opinion, those judges stated that the statute “lacks
features standard to the laws recognized as statutes of limitations with
presumptive equitable tolling” because it does not start the clock on
seeking a remedy for breach of a duty by an opposing party.317

308. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 92 (noting any deadline to respond begins once
notification is given to either the claimant or the attorney, but there is no requirement
the claimant must receive the notice).
309. Id. at 91.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 91, 93 (explaining that the employee argued for equitable tolling “even
if he failed to timely file”).
312. Id. at 95–96.
313. Id. at 96.
314. Judges Chen, Moore, Lourie, Prost, Taranto, and Hughes determined section
5110(b)(1) was not a statute of limitation. Arellano v. McDonough, 1 F.4th 1059, 1060–
61 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Judges Dyk, Newman, O’Malley, Reyna, Wallach, and Stoll held
that it was a statute of limitation. Id. at 1086 (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgment).
315. Id. at 1067.
316. Id.
317. Id.
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Although the “anti-tolling judges” determined that § 5110(b)(1) was
not a statute of limitations as in Irwin, they went further to find that
even if it was such a statute, the Irwin presumption was rebutted.318
Specifically, the judges found that Congress did not intend the
equitable tolling doctrine to apply to the statute because it is unlike a
statute of limitations in two regards. First, it does not act as a bar to
benefits. Second, and relatedly, § 5110(b)(1) lacks features standard
to the laws recognized as statutes of limitations with presumptive
equitable tolling: its one-year period is not triggered by harm from the
breach of a legal duty owed by the opposing party, and it does not start
the clock on seeking a remedy for that breach from a separate remedial
entity.319
The six judges who decided that § 5110(b)(1) could be equitably
tolled (the “pro-tolling judges”), led by Judge Dyk, characterized the
statute as a “time requirement” and relied on precedent in other courts
that applied tolling to statutory time requirements.320 The “pro-tolling
judges” stated that the “anti-tolling judges’” characterization of statutes
of limitations as applying only to breach-of-duty circumstances was
“bereft of support.”321 The judges pointed specifically to the Federal
Circuit’s previous application of tolling to the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986,322 where the trigger for a time limit aspect
of the statute was when a vaccine was taken regardless of any fault on
part of the vaccine manufacturer; thus, it lacked a breach of a duty.323
The “pro-tolling judges” also took issue with the “anti-tolling judges’”
claim that § 5110(b)(1) was not a statute of limitations since it did not
foreclose the ability of a veteran to collect benefits.324 The “pro-tolling
judges” characterized a veteran’s claim for benefits as actually
consisting of multiple claims—one for future monthly benefits and

318. See id. at 1079 (describing that the presumption was overcome because
Congress detailed specific choices where a veteran’s effective date may differ from
when VA received the application).
319. Id. at 1067.
320. Id. at 1087 (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgment).
321. Id. at 1088.
322. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat.
3755 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa).
323. Arellano, 1 F.4th at 1089 (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgment).
324. Id. at 1086.
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another for retroactive benefits—and § 5110(b)(1) prevented the
veteran from collecting retroactive benefits.325
Unlike the “anti-tolling judges,” the “pro-tolling judges” determined
the appellant met the Irwin presumption.326 The “pro-tolling judges”
applied several factors identified by the Supreme Court and
determined “almost all of the factors signal that there is no general
prohibition against equitable tolling.”327 The factors are the following:
(1) the language of the statute; (2) the detailed nature of the statute;
(3) the explicit exceptions in the statute; (4) the subject matter of the
statute; and (5) whether laypersons initiate the claim.328
The fourth and fifth factors discussed by the judges were particularly
instructive. The judges interpreted Supreme Court precedent to
indicate that Congress more likely intended that equitable tolling of a
statute of limitations was more appropriate in cases where laypersons,
not lawyers, initiate the process and the statute was unusually
protective of claimants.329 In fact, these are the hallmarks of the
veterans benefits system: as Judge Dyk explained, veterans often are
unrepresented, and “the uniquely pro-claimant nature of the veterans
compensation system” suggests that Congress intended at least some
form of equitable tolling to be available.330 In sum, the judges decided
that the language of the statute was not jurisdictional, and the nature
of the statute’s language was simple enough not to “weigh against
equitable tolling.”331 Further, although the judges acknowledged there
were exceptions in § 5110 to § 5110(a)(1)’s general rule, none of them

325. See, e.g., id. at 1089 (“The claim for benefits here has two components: (1) a
retrospective claim for benefits for past disability, and (2) a prospective claim for
future benefits. The statute imposes no statute of limitations for prospective benefits,
and a veteran may be entitled to forward-looking benefits after the one-year period
prescribed by § 5110(b)(1) runs.”).
326. See id. at 1092 (“Congress has not clearly indicated a general prohibition
against equitable tolling as to § 5110(b)(1).”).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1092–95.
329. Id. at 1094 (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 397
(1982)).
330. Id. at 1095 (citing Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see
also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 480 (1986) (addressing another statute
that protective of claimants); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428,
431 (2011) (“The VA’s adjudicatory ‘process is designed to function throughout with
a high degree of informality and solicitude for the claimant.’” (quoting Walters v. Nat’l
Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 311 (1985))).
331. See Arellano, 1 F.4th at 1093.
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were explicit to § 5110(b)(1), and thus the statute did not already
provide for equitable tolling.332
That the court was equally split indicates there is potential for the
Federal Circuit to apply equitable tolling in future § 5110(b)(1) cases.
A change in the makeup of the bench could tip the scales in favor of
the possibility of equitable tolling. In this regard, it is important to note
that Judge Newman was one of the three judges who declined to apply
equitable tolling in Andrews v. Principi in 2003.333 However, by 2010, in
Butler v. Shinseki, Judge Newman joined the opinion, cautioning that
Andrews had been read too broadly, stating, “[t]he time period of
§ 5110(b)(1) is not a jurisdictional restriction, and its blanket
immunization from equitable extension, whatever the circumstances,
appears to be directly contrary to the legislative purpose.”334
Notably, even the six judges who determined that tolling is a
generally available remedy did not find it was appropriate under Mr.
Arellano’s sympathetic circumstances.335 Accordingly, it appears
equitable tolling faces not only a legal hurdle in the interpretation of
§ 5110(b)(1) in light of the “anti-tolling judges’” view of Irwin, but also
a factual hurdle, requiring more persuasive circumstances than those
found in Arellano. Fortunately, the Supreme Court will add needed
guidance very soon. As the next case, Taylor v. McDonough, exemplifies,
the Federal Circuit did not express interest in quickly revisiting the
issue of equitable tolling.
B. Taylor v. McDonough—Equitable Estoppel
As in Arellano, the Taylor claim for an earlier effective date rests on
an assertion by a veteran that he was unable to file his benefits claim
within a year of discharge and was thus prevented from receiving the
earlier date permitted by § 5110(b)(1).336 Taylor was pending before
the en banc Federal Circuit before the Supreme Court’s grant of
certiorari in Arellano.337 A three-judge panel decision favoring Mr.
332. See id. at 1062.
333. Andrews v. Principi, 351 F.3d 1134, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
334. Butler v. Shinseki, 603 F.3d 922, 928 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
335. Arellano, 1 F.4th at 1060, 1063.
336. Taylor v. McDonough, 3 F.4th 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2021), vacated and reh’g
granted en banc per curium, 4 F.4th 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
337. Taylor v. McDonough, 4 F.4th 1381, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (en banc) (per
curiam); see supra note 295 and accompanying text (holding that a veteran’s effective
date of discharge will be the day he files a claim for compensation if filing occurs within
one year of discharge).
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Taylor’s position was issued in June 2021, but rehearing en banc was
ordered sua sponte, and the panel decision was vacated.338 Notably, the
three-judge panel included Judges Newman, O’Malley and Wallach,
who were “pro-tolling judges” in Arellano.339 Because of the equitable
tolling analysis in Arellano, the en banc order specifically stated that
equitable tolling would not be considered in the en banc review of
Taylor.340 As in Arellano, the case involved VA’s reliance on § 5110(a)(1)
as a limit on the effective date of Mr. Taylor’s claim to the year he filed
the claim for benefits.341
The facts of Taylor are compelling. Before serving two tours in
Vietnam, Mr. Taylor volunteered to serve his country in a unique
capacity.342 In 1969, the DoD sought soldiers who would serve as test
subjects for toxic chemical exposure, including nerve gas.343 The Army
sought to learn how U.S. soldiers would function when exposed to
chemical agents that combatants may encounter during their military
service.344 The military gave soldiers doses filled with an array of toxic
substances and subjected them to training exercises to measure their
performance.345 Based on the tests’ effects on Mr. Taylor’s health, VA
awarded him monthly compensation for Total Disability based upon
Individual Unemployability after Mr. Taylor filed his claim in 2007.346
Mr. Taylor claims the government’s conduct interfered with his
statutory right to an effective date of the day after his discharge.347 Prior
to participating in the tests, Mr. Taylor was required to sign an oath of
secrecy that, if broken, would have subjected him to criminal
prosecution and a dishonorable discharge—a characterization that
338. See Taylor, 4 F.4th at 1381 (noting the parties must also submit new briefing on
the case’s issues before the rehearing).
339. Taylor, 3 F.4th at 1355; see supra note 322 and accompanying text.
340. See Taylor, 4 F.4th at 1382 (“While the issue of equitable tolling is preserved,
the court does not wish to secure further briefing on equitable tolling and will not
revisit the issue of equitable tolling in this case, (A) the court having resolved that issue
adversely to Mr. Taylor in Andrews v. Principi . . . and (B) the court having recently
declined to set aside the decision in Andrews in Arellano v. McDonough.”).
341. Taylor v. McDonough, 3 F.4th at 1351.
342. Id. at 1356 (establishing that Mr. Taylor was an ammunitions records clerk in
Vietnam, but he volunteered to participate in military experiments).
343. Id. at 1356–57.
344. Id. at 1356.
345. Id. at 1357.
346. Id. at 1359.
347. Id. (explaining Taylor’s argument that he could not file for benefits due to the
secrecy issues surrounding the project, and that he did receive a letter allowing him to
file until 2006).
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would render him ineligible for benefits.348 This presented a quandary
for Mr. Taylor: in order to file an adequate claim for disability benefits,
Mr. Taylor needed to disclose his participation in the testing
program.349 This “Catch-22”—being unable to file for benefits without
becoming ineligible for benefits—left Mr. Taylor unable to exercise his
statutory right to request disability compensation.350
In 2006, thirty-seven years after the testing program, the DoD
declassified the names of the test participants and instructed the
participants to file for benefits.351 The declassification allowed Mr.
Taylor to file his aforementioned successful 2007 claim, in which VA
granted a 2007 effective date.352 Mr. Taylor requested that VA instead
award an effective date of the day after his discharge due to the
government conduct mentioned above, including the secrecy oath.353
Mr. Taylor asked the Veterans Court to apply the doctrine of
equitable estoppel to prevent VA from asserting 38 U.S.C. § 5110 as a
defense against his claim for an earlier effective date.354 He indicated
that, but for the oath of secrecy, he would have filed for benefits in
1971.355 The Veterans Court denied his request because it interpreted
its jurisdictional and scope of review statutes as excluding equitable
estoppel as an available remedy.356 Mr. Taylor then filed his appeal with
the Federal Circuit.357
The now-vacated three-judge panel decision of the Federal Circuit
found that the Veterans Court possessed the power to apply equitable
estoppel.358 It specifically found that the absence of an express statutory
348. Id. at 1356.
349. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (providing that the United States will pay
compensation to veterans for disabilities contracted in the line of duty or the
aggravation of a preexisting injury, in times of both war and peace); see also Shedden
v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that disability benefits
requires a service connection—”a causal relationship between the present disability
and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service”).
350. Taylor, 3 F.4th at 1359.
351. Id. at 1358 (“In June 2006, the VA sent letters to Edgewood Arsenal testing
program participants, including Mr. Taylor, notifying them that the ‘DoD had given
permission for those identified to disclose to health care providers information about
their involvement . . . that affected their health.”).
352. Id. at 1359.
353. Id. (arguing that his benefits “entitlement arose on September 7, 1971”).
354. Id. at 1360.
355. Id. at 1359.
356. Id. at 1360.
357. Id. at 1356.
358. Id. at 1364.
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grant of equitable power did not preclude the Veterans Court from
exercising equitable authority to estop the Secretary from denying Mr.
Taylor’s requested earlier effective date.359 The panel found that the
claim filing requirement of § 5110 is not jurisdictional and, therefore,
claim filing is subject to equitable considerations, such as waiver,
forfeiture, and estoppel.360 With regard to Andrews and equitable
tolling concerns, the three-judge panel came to the opposite
conclusion—that § 5110(b)(1) does function as a statute of limitations
“because it limits the relief available to veterans seeking serviceconnected disability benefits.”361 However, the panel acknowledged
that, being a panel and not the en banc court, it lacked the power to
overrule Andrews and thus held that equitable tolling was not available
to Mr. Taylor.362As it did in Arellano, the Federal Circuit’s sua sponte
rehearing en banc order requested briefing on discrete issues, which
were decided in favor of the veteran in the panel decision.363 The court
ordered briefing on the issue of whether equitable estoppel, but not
equitable tolling, could apply and whether the Appropriations Clause
precluded relief, which would require the court to overrule an earlier
case.364 The court further directed the parties to address whether—in
the absence of equitable relief—Mr. Taylor’s constitutional right of
access to the courts was violated and, if so, what the proper remedy
would include.365 The right to access question included inquiry into
the proper tests for the analysis.366
Taylor presents an opportunity for the Federal Circuit to articulate
very favorable law for veterans relating to the Veterans Court’s power
to provide equitable relief. In the panel’s words, “[i]f equitable
estoppel is ever to lie against the Government, it is here.”367 The
uniqueness of Mr. Taylor’s facts is such that a finding of equitable
estoppel could occur without concern of opening floodgates.

359. Id. at 1365.
360. Id. at 1366.
361. Id. at 1372.
362. Id.
363. Taylor v. McDonough, 4 F.4th 1381, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
364. Id.
365. Id. at 1382.
366. Id. (“If there is such a right of access, is the test for its violation whether the
government has engaged in ‘active interference’ that is ‘undue’ . . . ? If not, what is the
test?”).
367. Taylor, 3 F.4th at 1374.

1670

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1619

Hopefully, equitable estoppel will be a viable doctrine after the
Taylor rehearing and the Supreme Court’s decision in Arellano.
Advocates must continue to advocate zealously in favor of the veteran
where government conduct is over-reaching, unconscionable, or
otherwise without any basis in law. Veterans advocates should keep in
mind the constitutional right to access, as it may also provide powerful
arguments.
VI. EFFECTIVE DATES
In addition to Arellano and Taylor, the Federal Circuit continued to
explain the nuance of effective dates in four cases: Kisor v.
McDonough;368 George v. McDonough;369 Ortiz v. McDonough;370 and
Buffington v. McDonough.371 As noted above, effective dates are
important to veterans because they mark the date on which the benefit
is payable.372 Because VA appeals can take many years, when a claim is
finally granted, the veteran receives a retroactive payment back to the
effective date.373
A. The Term “Relevant” is Unambiguous Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)
While not framed in the rubric of equity like Arellano and Taylor,
Kisor touches upon fairness considerations, like those giving rise to
equitable doctrines. In Kisor, the Federal Circuit declined both the
opportunity to make a veteran-friendly interpretation of an arguably
ambiguous statute, and further constricted the application of the proveteran canon in cases of interpretative ambiguity.374 Kisor involved a
veteran who disputed the effective date of his disability compensation
claim.375 Unlike the veterans in Arellano and Taylor, Mr. Kisor was not
seeking an effective date prior to the date he filed his claim.376 Instead,
his challenge relied on a VA regulation that provided that when service
368. 995 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
369. 991 F.3d 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
370. No. 19-0070, 2021 WL 4464357 (Vet. App. Sept. 30, 2021).
371. 7 F.4th 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
372. Getting an Earlier Effective Date for VA Disability Claims, CHISHOLM CHISHOLM &
KILPATRICK
LTD,
https://cck-law.com/veterans-law/earlier-va-effective-date-ofdisability/#:~:text=An%20effective%20date%20is%20used,disability%20compensatio
n%20or%20increased%20compensation [https://perma.cc/6XA7-LXZJ].
373. Id.
374. Kisor v. McDonough, 995 F.3d 1316, 1322, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
375. Id. at 1320.
376. Id. at 1318.
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records were not considered in an initial review in which benefits were
denied, but were later included in a subsequent review that resulted in
an award, the effective date should be the date of the initial claim.377
The court noted that “[38 C.F.R.] § 3.156(c) serves to place a veteran
in the position he would have been had VA considered the relevant
service department record before the disposition of his earlier
claim.”378
Specifically, VA regulation 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1) provides that “at
any time after VA issues a decision on a claim, if VA receives or
associates with the claims file relevant official service department
records that existed and had not been associated with the claims file
when VA first decided the claim, VA will reconsider the claim.”379 The
regulation further provides that “[a]n award made based all or in part
on the records identified by paragraph (c)(1) of this section is effective
on the date entitlement arose or the date VA received the previously
decided claim.”380
With regard to Mr. Kisor’s claim, the record showed that in 1982,
when he first filed his claim for PTSD, VA did not award him benefits
due to a lack of diagnosis of PTSD by the evaluating physician.381 At the
time of this denial, the Regional Office had a psychiatric report that
contained statements by Mr. Kisor that he participated in Operation
Harvest Moon in Vietnam, but it did not have any service department
records corroborating these statements.382 In 2006, he asked that his
claim be reopened, and, in 2007, VA awarded benefits for PTSD with
an effective date of 2006.383 In reviewing the reopened claim, the
service department records substantiating the veteran’s statements in
the psychiatric report were in the possession of the Regional Office.384

377. See id. at 1322–23 (discussing the different procedures through which a veteran
can seek to revise a denial of a claim for disability benefits); see also 38 C.F.R
§ 3.156(c)(1) (2021) (outlining the impact of new evidence on the adjudication of
claims).
378. Kisor, 995 F.3d at 1323 (citing Blubaugh v. McDonald, 773 F.3d 1310, 1313
(Fed. Cir. 2014)).
379. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (c)(1).
380. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (c)(3).
381. Kisor, 995 F.3d at 1319, 1321.
382. Id. at 1319 (providing details of Operation Harvest Moon—“he was on a search
operation when his company came under attack . . . ‘which resulted in 13 deaths in a
large company’”).
383. Id. at 1320.
384. Id.
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Mr. Kisor filed a Notice of Disagreement challenging the effective
date.385 On appeal, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals sua sponte assessed
whether, under § 3.156(c)(3), the veteran was entitled to a 1982
effective date because the service department records in the file in
2006 were relevant to the original claim filed in 1982, and thus within
the scope of the earlier effective date contemplated by § 3.156(c).386
The Board determined the records were not relevant to the 1982 claim
because they did not make a difference in the outcome—VA
considered Mr. Kisor’s service in Operation Harvest Moon since it was
included in the psychiatric report, and VA did not dispute the truth of
his involvement at the time.387 Instead, the previous denial was based
upon the lack of a PTSD diagnosis.
The Board’s decision was upheld in both the Veterans Court and the
Federal Circuit.388 In Kisor I,389 the Federal Circuit analyzed the Board’s
decision using the administrative law principle known as Auer deference,
whereby the court defers to an agency’s interpretation of its own
ambiguous regulation if the interpretation is reasonable—instead of a
de novo interpretation of the regulation.390 In Kisor I, the court held
that the regulation was ambiguous concerning the word “relevant” and
that the agency’s interpretation was reasonable.391The U.S. Supreme
Court considered Mr. Kisor’s case in Kisor v. Wilkie392 (Kisor II), which
was covered in depth in the last edition of this Area Summary.393 The
Supreme Court remanded the case to the Federal Circuit with
instructions to determine if the regulation was indeed ambiguous.394
The decision discussed herein, Kisor III, is the Federal Circuit’s opinion

385. Id.
386. Id. at 1320–21.
387. Id. at 1318.
388. Id.
389. Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. granted, Kisor v. Wilkie,
139 S. Ct. 657 (2018), vacated and remanded, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
390. Id. at 1367; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997) (examining
the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of his own regulation and deciding the
Secretary’s interpretation was controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation).
391. Kisor I, 869 F.3d at 1368.
392. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
393. See generally Angela Drake et al., Review of Recent Veterans Law Decisions of the
Federal Circuit, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 1343, 1350–54 (2020) (discussing Kisor I and Kisor II
in detail).
394. Kisor II, 139 S. Ct. at 2423–24.
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on remand from the Supreme Court on the issue of statutory
interpretation.
Unfortunately for Mr. Kisor, the Federal Circuit decided the
regulation was unambiguous on remand, even though it previously
had found ambiguity in the word “relevant” and deferred to the
agency.395 The court held that “[t]o be relevant, a record must be
relevant to the issue that was dispositive against the veteran in VA
adjudication of the claim sought to be reconsidered and, in that way,
bear on the outcome of the case.”396 The court keyed in on the
language in § 3.156(c) that an effective date is retroactive to the
previous claim if the award is “based all or in part on” the newly
identified records.397
In addition to changing its view on whether the word “relevant” was
ambiguous, the court rejected Mr. Kisor’s contention that the proveteran canon should be taken into account when determining—in
the first instance—if there is ambiguity.398 The pro-veteran canon is
one of statutory construction, requiring that interpretive doubt be
resolved in the veteran’s favor.399
In Kisor III, the Court found no interpretive doubt, even though it
previously found the regulation ambiguous and despite the fact that
both the veteran and VA proffered diametrically opposed and
seemingly reasonable interpretations.400 Yet, given its conclusion that
there was no interpretive doubt, the Court had no reason to resort to
any canons of statutory construction.401
This conclusion should concern veterans advocates. As Judge Reyna
points out in dissent, the court has employed the pro-veteran canon in

395. Kisor v. McDonough, 995 F.3d 1316, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Both the 2017 and
2020 decisions were before Alvin A. Schall and Evan J. Wallach, who were majority,
and Jimmie V. Reyna who dissented in 2020 but not in 2017. Fun quote from the
dissent: “Not to be left behind, the majority has decided to follow the VA and to adopt
the agency’s new belief that the very same text we initially declared ambiguous has
sprung a lack of ‘interpretive doubt.’” Id. at 1326.
396. Id. at 1322.
397. Id. at 1323–24.
398. Id. at 1325–26 (“[T]he canon does not apply unless ‘interpretive doubt’ is
present . . . [and that] precondition is not satisfied where a sole reasonable meaning
is identified through the use of ordinary textual analysis tools, before consideration of
the pro-veteran canon.”).
399. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 117–18 (1994) (establishing the rule that
“interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor”).
400. Kisor v. McDonough, 995 F.3d 1316, 1319, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
401. Id. at 1325–26.
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many contexts, including when the plain text does not expressly exclude
the veteran’s interpretation, when a dictionary definition is inconsistent
with the veteran’s understanding, and when countervailing legislative
history exists.402 Judge Reyna explained that while the canon may not
“be dispositive of a provision’s meaning every time it is applied, [the
court is] obligated to weigh it alongside the other tools of construction
when the text itself gives us doubt.”403 At base, the issue between the
majority and Judge Reyna is timing: when to resort to the pro-veteran
canon. Kisor III instructs that it is unnecessary to use the canon unless
there is interpretive doubt in the first instance, and Judge Reyna in
dissent cautions that while the pro-veteran canon applies only to
ambiguous statutes and cannot override plain text, the canon is not “a
tool of last resort, subordinate to all others.”404 In strong words, Judge
Reyna writes, “the pro-veteran canon is squarely rooted in the purpose
of veterans’ benefit provisions, which we are bound to consider and
effectuate in every construction.”405
B. Invalidated Regulations is Not a Basis for CUE
In George, VA denied the claims of two appellants, Kevin George and
Michael Martin, several decades ago.406 They both filed a motion for
revision of those denials, alleging that VA had committed clear and
unmistakable error (CUE).407 VA originally denied Mr. George and
Mr. Martin under the then-existing regulation 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b).408
Section 3.304(b) only required clear and unmistakable evidence to
rebut the presumption of soundness, but did not require VA show clear
and unmistakable evidence that the condition was not aggravated.409

402. Id. at 1336–37 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
403. Id. at 1337 (citing Sursely v. Peake, 551 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
Hudgens v. McDonald, 823 F.3d 630, 637 (2016); Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocs., Inc.
v. Secretary, 260 F.3d 1365, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
404. Id. at 1325, 1336.
405. Id. at 1337.
406. George v. McDonough, 991 F.3d 1227, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142
S. Ct. 858 (2022).
407. Id. at 1229.
408. Id.; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b) (2003) (“The veteran will be considered to
have been in sound condition when examined, accepted and enrolled for service
except . . . where clear and unmistakable (obvious or manifest) evidence demonstrates
that an injury or disease existed prior thereto. Only such conditions as are recorded in
examination reports are to be considered as noted.” (emphasis added)).
409. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b).
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Years later in 2004, § 3.304(b) was invalidated by Wagner v. Principi.410
In Wagner, the Federal Circuit held that the plain reading of 38 U.S.C.
§ 1111 requires VA to show (1) clear and unmistakable evidence for
both a preexisting condition; and (2) a lack of aggravation to
overcome the presumption of soundness.411 Thus, the court in Wagner
found § 3.304(b) invalid.412
Prior to the Wagner decision, the now invalid 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b)
was applied in Mr. George’s case. When Mr. George entered the
military, there was no mention of any psychiatric disorders.413 A week
into service, Mr. George suffered from a psychotic episode, and the
military diagnosed him with schizophrenia.414 Two months into his
service, they found Mr. George unfit for duty and determined that his
condition preexisted his service.415 Although “the Board did not
specifically cite the statutory presumption of soundness or the
implementing regulation,” in its 1977 decision, the Board relied on
factors in § 3.304(b) when it denied Mr. George’s claim, finding that
his condition existed prior to his entering the military and was not
aggravated by his service.416 In 2014, Mr. George filed a CUE claim,
asserting that the Board failed to correctly apply the plain reading of
38 U.S.C. § 1111.417 In its 2016 decision, the Board found that the 1977
version of § 3.304(b) did not require clear and unmistakable evidence
to rebut the presumption that the disability was not aggravated by
service.418 Mr. George appealed, and the Veterans Court determined
“that permitting retroactive application of Wagner’s statutory
interpretation would contravene the law on finality of judgments.”419

410. 370 F.3d 1089, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
411. Id. at 1097.
412. See id. at 1091, 1097 (explaining that the regulation required only the element
of clear and unmistakable evidence but finding that the correct standard requires the
second element of an aggravated pre-existing disability).
413. George, 991 F.3d at 1230.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 1111 (“[E]very veteran shall be taken to have been in
sound condition when examined, accepted, and enrolled for service, except . . . where
clear and unmistakable evidence demonstrates that the injury or disease existed
before . . . such service.”).
418. George, 991 F.3d at 1231.
419. Id.
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Similarly, when Mr. Martin entered the service, he “reported never
having had asthma, shortness of breath, or hay fever.”420 His entrance
physical reported that his lungs and chest were normal.421 During his
second period of service, he went to an allergy clinic for treatment.422
During that visit, he reported “a childhood history of asthma.”423 When
he exited service, the “separation examination did not report any
asthma or related symptoms.”424 Shortly after service in 1969, Mr.
Martin filed a claim for asthma.425 The Regional Office denied the
claim since it preexisted service and was not aggravated.426 In July 2013,
Mr. Martin requested revision of the 1970 decision based on CUE,
since the Regional Office failed to apply both prongs of § 1111.427 The
Veterans Court also affirmed this decision relying upon its decision in
George.428
The appellants appealed these decisions to the Federal Circuit,
arguing that their CUE claims did not seek to retroactively apply a
changed interpretation, but rather simply apply the statute as
written.429 The Federal Circuit, in Judge Chen’s opinion, disagreed and
emphasized the importance of VA’s regulation that existed at the
time.430 The Federal Circuit clarified that the new interpretation of a
statute by the court can only retroactively affect open decisions but
cannot affect decisions that are already final.431 Congress did not
intend for changes in the law subsequent to the original adjudication
to provide a basis for revising a final decision.432 The Federal Circuit
held that Wagner could not serve as the basis for an appellant’s CUE

420. Id. at 1232 (internal quotations omitted).
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 1232–33.
427. Id. at 1233; see 38 U.S.C. 1111 (presuming sound condition unless (1) clear
and unmistakable evidence demonstrates that the veteran’s injury or disease existed
before acceptance and (2) the injury or disease was not aggravated the veteran’s
service).
428. George, 991 F.3d at 1233 (relying on the Board’s finding that the regulation did
not apply retroactively to final decisions).
429. Id. at 1234.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. See id. (“Congress[] inten[ded] that ‘changes in the law subsequent to the
original adjudication . . . do not provide a basis for revising a finally decided case.’”).
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claim due to Congress’s intent behind the CUE statute.433 Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court decisions.434
This case reinforces the rarity of CUE in previous final decisions. VA
and the Board cannot look to newly interpreted law or cases to
determine whether CUE exists. Mr. George petitioned for certiorari
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari for the October 2021
term.435
C. 38 C.F.R § 3.304(f)(3) is a Liberalizing Law Entitling Veterans to an
Earlier Effective Date
In Ortiz, the Federal Circuit determined 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3) was
a liberalizing regulation entitling the claimant to an extra year of
benefits under § 3.114(a)(3).436 Under § 3.114(a):
[W]here . . . compensation . . . is awarded . . . pursuant to a
liberalizing law or VA issue . . . a claim [] reviewed at the request of
the claimant more than 1 year after the effective date of the law . . .
, benefits may be authorized for a period of 1 year prior to the date
of receipt.437

VA denied Mr. Ortiz’s first claim for benefits for PTSD.438 Mr. Ortiz
filed to reopen his claim for PTSD in 2012 and did so under a 2010
change to § 3.304(f)(3).439 The updated version of this regulation
allowed a veteran’s lay testimony to establish an in-service stressor,440 so
long as the stressor was related to the veteran’s fear of hostile military
or terrorist activity.441 This regulation established an exception to the

433. Id. at 1237.
434. Id.
435. George v. McDonough, 991 F.3d 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Aug. 13, 2021) (No. 21-234).
436. Ortiz v. McDonough, 6 F.4th 1267, 1269-70 (Fed. Cir. 2021); see also 38 C.F.R.
3.304 (2010) (describing the requirements for direct service connection for
posttraumatic stress disorder).
437. 38 C.F.R. § 3.114 (2020).
438. Ortiz, 6 F.4th at 1273.
439. Id. Compare 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3) (2010) (PTSD stressor related to a prisonerof-war experience), with 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3) (2011) (PTSD stressor related to fear
of hostile military activity based on personal testimony).
440. As a general matter, service connection for a disability requires evidence of:
(1) the existence of a current disability; (2) the existence of the disease or injury in
service, and; (3) a relationship or nexus between the current disability and any injury
or disease during service. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166–67 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
441. Ortiz, 6 F.4th at 1274–75 (noting that Mr. Ortiz’s diagnosis of PTSD based on
fear was sufficient under the new evidentiary standard).
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normal evidentiary burden to corroborate the PTSD stressor.442
Because of this new regulation, Mr. Ortiz was awarded benefits back to
when he first applied for them in 2012.443 Mr. Ortiz requested an
additional year of benefits under § 3.114(a)(3).444
The Board found that § 3.304(f)(3) is not a liberalizing rule,
following the Veterans Court’s decision in Foreman v. Shulkin.445 In
Foreman, the court defined “liberalizing” as a law that creates a new and
different entitlement to service connection.446 The Veterans Court
determined that § 3.304(f) did not create a new entitlement to service
connection, rather it merely relaxed the evidentiary standard.447 The
court found that § 3.304(f)(3) was procedural and not liberalizing for
effective date purposes.448 The Veterans Court in its memorandum
decision also followed Foreman and affirmed the Board’s decision.449
The question before the Federal Circuit was the meaning of the term
“liberalizing” in § 3.114(a).450 Judge Taranto first looked to the plain
meaning of “liberalizing” and determined that it meant “to make
policies or laws less strict.”451 The court found that the 2010 regulation
change was a “prototypical example of a ‘liberalizing’ change resulting
in an ‘award.’”452 Thus, the court found that § 3.304(f)(3) relaxed the
veteran’s affirmative responsibility in supporting his claim for
benefits.453
The Secretary, however, relied on two prior cases, Spencer v. Brown454
and Routen v. West,455 to argue that the court should not apply the
ordinary meaning of liberalizing.456 In Spencer, the veteran applied for
service connection for his multiple sclerosis, but VA denied his

442. Id. at 1274.
443. Id. at 1275.
444. Id. at 1269.
445. Foreman v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 146 (2018); Ortiz v. Wilkie, No. 19-0070, 2020
WL 1173715, at *1 (Vet. App. Mar. 12, 2020) (citing Foreman, 29 Vet. App. 146), rev’d
sub nom. Ortiz, 6 F.4th 1267.
446. Foreman, 29 Vet. App. at 151.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 152.
449. Ortiz, 6 F.4th at 1275.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 1276.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. 17 F.3d 368 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
455. 142 F.3d 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
456. Ortiz, 6 F.4th at 1277.

2022]

REVIEW OF VETERANS LAW DECISIONS

1679

claim.457 Later, he reapplied and requested that VA reopen his claim
because he had “new and material” evidence.458 He also asked to have
his claim considered under the VJRA, which was an intervening change
in the law.459 The Board and the Veterans Court rejected his claim
since there was no new and material evidence to justify reopening the
claim.460 The Federal Circuit determined that the VJRA changes on
which the veteran relied did not constitute a new basis of entitlement
based on a change in law because they did not “substantively affect[]
the nature” of the decided claim.461 The court engaged in a statutory
interpretation analysis to determine whether the VJRA was a
“liberalizing” law, “i.e., one which brought about a substantive change
in the law creating a new and different entitlement to a benefit.”462
However, the court only examined whether the VJRA was procedural
or substantive change in the law, and it did not specifically define the
term “liberalizing.”463
Similarly in Routen, the veteran filed to reopen a claim and requested
that VA look at his claim under a new regulatory change related to the
Secretary’s burden to rebut the presumption that the veteran’s injury
was aggravated during service.464 The court found that the new
regulation was only “procedural in nature” and was not substantive and
thus, not “liberalizing.”465
In Ortiz, the court found that § 3.304(f)(3) established a new basis
of entitlement and was not procedural in nature.466 The court looked

457. Spencer, 17 F.3d at 370 (denying his claim there was insufficient evidence “that
the disability was incurred in or aggravated by his service in the military”).
458. Id. at 371.
459. See id. (relying on the VJRA, which was passed in 1988, to appeal his claim to
the Board in 1990).
460. Id. at 371, 374.
461. Id. at 372–73.
462. Id. at 372.
463. Id.
464. Routen v. West, 142 F.3d 1434, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Aggravation of
Preservice Disability, 57 Fed. Reg. 59296, 59296 (Dec. 15, 1992) (combining the
wartime and peacetime standards to rebut the presumption of aggravation of a
preservice injury by requiring VA to apply the clear and unmistakable evidentiary
standard for both under 38 C.F.R. § 3.306(b)); 38 C.F.R. § 3.306(b) (1993) (codifying
the 1992 regulatory change in the C.F.R.).
465. See Routen, 142 F.3d at 1441–42 (declaring that an “intervening change in law
[must] create[] a new cause of action” for a veteran to reopen their claim).
466. Ortiz v. McDonough, 6 F.4th 1267, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2021), remanded to No. 190070, 2021 WL 4464357 (Vet. App. Sept. 30, 2021).
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to VA’s “Final Rule” when adopting the 2010 regulation.467 VA stated
that the regulation “effectively ‘eliminate[d]’ an evidentiary
‘requirement’ when the specific preconditions were met.”468 Further,
VA stated that it was “amending its adjudication regulations governing
service connection for . . . [PTSD] by liberalizing in some cases the
evidentiary standard for establishing the required in-service
stressor.”469 The Veterans Court and VA have stated that this regulatory
change was done for procedural reasons; however, the Federal Circuit
was clear that a change to the law for efficiency does not change the
nature of the substantive change.470 Therefore, even though a
regulation is created for procedural reasons, the law may still be
“liberalizing” as it reduces the burden of proof on veteran claimants.471
This case not only opens the possibility that regulatory changes that
lower evidentiary standards will be considered liberalizing, but also
allows the liberalizing standard in § 3.114 to apply for earlier effective
date purposes. In addition to the regulation impacting PTSD, VA and
the courts have recognized that presumptions, like new Agent Orange
presumptions, meet this liberalizing standard.472 As advocates consider
whether their clients are entitled to an earlier effective date, they must
now consider whether the benefit was granted under a “liberalizing”
standard as defined by Ortiz.473
D. Veterans Have an Affirmative Duty to Reapply for Benefits After a
Subsequent Period of Service Under § 3.654(b)(2)
In Buffington v. McDonough,474 the issue presented was whether 38
C.F.R. § 3.654(b)(2) was a permissible regulation under VA’s statutory
scheme.475 Various statutes are important to understand the background
of the Federal Circuit’s analysis. First, 38 U.S.C. § 5101(a)(1)(A) requires

467. Id. at 1282; see also Stressor Determinations for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder,
75 Fed. Reg. 39843 (July 13, 2010).
468. Ortiz, 6 F.4th at 1282 (quoting 75 Fed. Reg. at 39843).
469. Id. at 1283.
470. Id. (“A substantive change can be made to achieve process benefits.”).
471. Id. at 1270.
472. Id. at 1281.
473. Id. at 1270.
474. 7 F.4th 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
475. Id. at 1363 (addressing the veteran’s contention that the regulation conflicts
with 38 U.S.C. § 5304(c)); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.652(b) (2020); 38 U.S.C. § 5304(c)
(2018).
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a veteran to apply for disability benefits in order to receive them.476
Second, under 38 U.S.C. § 5110, VA will set an effective date for those
benefits.477 Third, under 38 U.S.C. § 5304(c) and § 5112, VA may need
to discontinue disability benefits if the veteran returns to active duty
and will set an effective date for that discontinuance.478 The question
presented in Buffington was whether the Secretary can determine how
compensation will recommence after a veteran is discharged from a
subsequent period of service.479
In this case, Mr. Thomas Buffington served on active duty from 1992
to 2000.480 When he left the service, Mr. Buffington was service
connected for tinnitus.481 Mr. Buffington returned to active duty in
2003.482 Once Mr. Buffington resumed active service, VA stopped his
compensation because, by statute, veterans cannot receive
compensation benefits and active duty pay.483 In 2004, Mr. Buffington
completed his active period, but late that year he was reactivated until
July 2005.484 In 2009, Mr. Buffington sought to restart his benefits, and
VA provided an effective date of 2008.485 He appealed the effective
date, requesting that the benefits begin when he was released from
active duty service in 2005.486 Mr. Buffington argued that the statutes
obligate VA to pay compensation for service connected disabilities, set
effective dates, and provide a limited exception for when payments are
barred.487 Furthermore, such compensation “runs parallel to the

476. Buffington, 7 F.4th at 1364; see also 38 U.S.C. § 5101(a)(1)(A) (2018) (“[A]
specific claim . . . must be filed in order for benefits to be paid . . . .”).
477. Buffington, 7 F.4th at 1364; see also 38 U.S.C. § 5110 (2018) (“[T]he effective
date of an award based on an initial claim, or a supplemental claim, . . . shall be fixed
in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier than the date of receipt of
application therefor.”).
478. 38 U.S.C. § 5304(c) (“[C]ompensation . . . on account of any person’s own
service shall not be paid to such person for any period for which such person receives
active service pay.”).
479. Buffington, 7 F.4th at 1364.
480. Id. at 1363.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id.; see 38 U.S.C. § 5304(c).
484. Buffington, 7 F.4th at 1363.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 1363, 1365 (arguing that benefits “restart[] at discharge from active
military service,” which in this case was in 2005).
487. Id. at 1365.
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period of service: stopping on re-entry to active military service and
restarting at discharge from active military service.”488
Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Moore found that the statutory
language contained a gap because it did not explicitly explain how a
veteran would recommence benefits after a subsequent period of
service.489 To fill the statutory gap, VA previously promulgated 38
C.F.R. § 3.654(b)(2), which provides that:
[P]ayments . . . will be resumed effective the day following release
from active duty if claim for recommencement of payments is
received within 1 year from the date of such release: otherwise
payments will be resumed effective 1 year prior to the date of receipt
of a new claim.490

The Federal Circuit examined the agency’s regulation and looked
to whether the regulation was a “permissible construction of the
statute” after determining there was indeed a clear gap in the statute.491
The court found that this regulation was a reasonable gap-filling
regulation.492
In her dissent, Judge O’Malley disagreed with the majority that there
was any statutory gap, pointing to context that provided insight into
congressional intent.493 Under 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110 and 1131, VA will pay
veterans compensation for their service-connected disabilities, and 38
U.S.C. § 5110(a) explains when the payments will start.494 A pause of
payments will occur when a veteran reenters active duty.495 Judge
O’Malley recognized that the statutes do not mention a
recommencement date, but Congress’s language only wanted
payments to cease while a veteran was on active duty.496 Furthermore,
the dissent argues that Congress never intended for a veteran to lose

488. Id.
489. Id. at 1364–65.
490. 38 C.F.R. § 3.654(b)(2) (2020).
491. Buffington, 7 F.4th at 1364 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1983)).
492. Id. at 1367.
493. Id. at 1368 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
494. Id. at 1369 (citing 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5110(a) (2018)) (“Congress knew
how to set dates for commencement of benefits when it deemed it necessary to do so,
and, when doing so, it always assured that benefits would commence sooner rather
than later.”).
495. Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5304(c) (2018)).
496. Id. at 1369 (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (“The plain text of Title 38 [§ 5304(c)]
indicates that Congress intended for veterans’ benefits to discontinue during ‘any
period’ of active service pay.”).
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his original effective date after returning to active duty.497 The
appellants have petitioned for certiorari at the Supreme Court.498
Veterans who receive VA benefits and are activated to military service
must reapply for their benefits in order for VA to restart the benefits
after discharge.499 If done within a year, a veteran’s effective date will
go back to the date after leaving service.500
VII. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT OVERTURNED THREE REGULATIONS
ASSOCIATED WITH VA’S NEW APPEALS MODERNIZATION ACT
In Military-Veterans Advocacy v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs,501 the
Federal Circuit reviewed four petitions that challenged the validity of
thirteen regulations associated with the Veterans Appeals
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 (AMA).502 Of the
challenged regulations, the Federal Circuit found standing and
overturned only three regulatory challenges.503 The Federal Circuit
dismissed the remaining ten challenges for lack of standing.504 This
Part will discuss the history of the AMA, the standing concerns on
regulatory challenges, the overturned regulations, and the future of
other AMA regulatory challenges.
A. Brief History of the AMA
In the former appeals process, now called the Legacy System,
veterans were required to file a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) to
appeal an unfavorable rating decision.505 Veterans had one year to file
this appeal from the date of the decision letter.506 After the NOD was
filed, VA would send an explanation of its decision called the
Statement of the Case (SOC).507 Before the AMA was passed, on
average, VA took 500 days to issue an SOC after a veteran filed an

497. Id.
498. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Buffington, 7 F.4th 1361 (No. 21-972).
499. Buffington, 7 F.4th at 1366–67.
500. Id. at 1367.
501. 7 F.4th 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
502. Id. at 1117; Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017,
Pub. L No. 115-55, 131 Stat. 1105; see also VA Claims and Appeals Modernization, 84
Fed. Reg. 138 (Jan. 18, 2019) (implementing the AMA).
503. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1117.
504. Id.
505. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a) (2012).
506. Id. § 7105(b)(1).
507. 38 C.F.R. § 19.26 (2016).
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NOD.508 To appeal the SOC, a veteran would file a Form 9 within sixty
days of the SOC.509 Once VA received the Form 9, it would then certify
the appeal to the Board.510 On average, it would take 773 days for the
Form 9 to be certified.511 All of these actions occurred under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Office.512 On average, a veteran waited
1,273 days after issuance of a rating decision for their appeal to reach
the Board.513 Once at the Board, veterans waited an additional 568 days
for a Board decision.514 The process from the first decision to a final
Board decision took 1,841 days, or a little over five years.515 Throughout
the Legacy Process, veterans could submit new evidence at any point
and each decision was a de novo review.516 Once a claim was final, a
veteran could request to reopen the case with new and material
evidence.517
In 2017, the AMA was introduced in Congress to expedite VA
appeals processes and protect veterans’ due process rights.518 Congress
acknowledged that the appeals process was broken.519 The increased
number of pending appeals and the length of time veterans waited for
a decision forced Congress to act.520 Congress’s goal was to streamline
the appeals process and finalize decisions in a shorter period of time.521
To streamline the process, Congress converted the linear appeals
process into a process that included more choice for the veteran.522
Instead of requiring an NOD after a rating decision, VA allowed three
types of appeals: (1) supplemental claims; (2) higher-level review; and
(3) an NOD directly to the Board.523 The supplemental claim allows
508. 2017 VA BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS ANN. REP. 25, https://www.bva.va.gov
/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2017AR.pdf [https://perma.cc/747G-9TZ3].
509. 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.202, 20.302(b)(1) (2016).
510. Id. § 19.35.
511. 2017 VA BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS ANN. REP., supra note 508, at 25.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. 38 C.F.R. § 20.800 (2016).
517. Id. § 3.156(a).
518. H.R. REP. NO. 115-135, at 2 (2017).
519. Id. at 5.
520. See id. (noting that veterans were waiting anywhere from three to five years, but
if nothing changed, the wait time would likely increase to ten years).
521. See id. (intending to “reduce VA’s appeals workload and help ensure that the
process is both timely and fair”).
522. Id. at 2 (giving veterans three procedural options).
523. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5104B, 5108, 7105 (2018).
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the veteran to submit new and relevant evidence to substantiate their
claim.524 This type of appeal permits a veteran to have a hearing,
including any new testimony that they would like to provide.525 The
Regional Office would continue to hold jurisdiction over the claim.526
The second type, a higher-level review, restricts the veteran from
submitting any additional information into the record.527 However, this
appeal allows the veteran to hold an informal conference with the
adjudicator to discuss any legal argument based on the record.528 The
Regional Offices seek to process supplemental claims and higher-level
reviews within 125 days.529
The last appellate choice is an NOD to the Board.530 This option also
allows the veteran to have a choice between a direct review lane, an
evidence lane, and a hearing lane.531 The direct review lane restricts
the veteran to the evidence of record, and the Board will not consider
any additional evidence.532 The Board’s goal is to complete these
decisions within 365 days of the appeal.533 The evidence lane allows a
veteran to submit additional evidence within ninety days of the
appeal.534 The final lane gives veterans an opportunity for a hearing
before the Board.535 The last two lanes have no timeline goals, although
they are likely to take longer than the direct review lane.536
Additionally, Congress removed the term “reopen” and allowed the
veteran to seek re-adjudication through the supplemental claim lane
after a final decision with new and relevant evidence.537
Because of these major changes to the appellate process, VA had to
create additional regulations to help fill some of the gaps and change
language in existing regulations to align with the new process.538 Of the
thirteen regulations that were challenged in Military-Veterans Advocacy,
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.

Id. § 5108.
38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a), (d)(2) (2020).
Id. § 3.103(c)(2)(i).
38 U.S.C. § 5104B(d).
38 C.F.R. § 3.2601(h) (2020).
VA Claims and Appeals Modernization, 84 Fed. Reg. 138, 147 (Jan. 18, 2019).
38 U.S.C. § 7105 (2018).
Id. § 7105(b)(3).
Id.
84 Fed. Reg. at 153.
38 C.F.R. § 20.1305(a) (2021).
84 Fed. Reg. at 145.
See id. at 153.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 166.
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ten challenges were dismissed for lack of standing, and three
regulations were overturned.539
B. Challenges to Standing
Relying on 38 U.S.C. § 502,540 several veterans advocacy organizations—
the Military-Veterans Advocacy (MVA), the National Organization of
Veterans’ Advocates (NOVA) with Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA)
intervening, Carpenter Chartered, and National Veterans Legal Services
Program (NVLSP)—filed four petitions regarding various regulations
related to the AMA.541 Together, the petitioners challenged the validity of
thirteen regulations.542 NVLSP challenged 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a)(1)(iv).543
MVA also challenged § 3.105(a)(1)(iv) and additionally raised
§ 14.636(c)(1)(i) and § 20.202(c)(2).544 NOVA and PVA’s petition
challenged § 3.155(b), § 3.156(b), § 3.2500(b), § 3.2500(d), and
§ 20.205(c).545 Finally, Carpenter Chartered challenged ten regulations,
four raised by others (§ 3.105(a)(1)(iv), § 3.2500(d)–(e), § 20.205(c),
and § 14.636(c)(1)(i)) and “further raised six additional challenges, to:
38 C.F.R. § 3.1(p)(1)–(2), 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2), 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.151(c)(1)–(2), 38 C.F.R. § 14.636(c)(2)–(3), 38 C.F.R. § 20.202(a),
and 38 C.F.R. § 20.800(e).”546
539. Military-Veterans Advoc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affs., 7 F.4th 1110, 1117 (Fed. Cir.
2021).
540. 38 U.S.C. § 502 (subjecting VA rulemaking to direct judicial review by the
Federal Circuit).
541. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1117 & n.1.
542. See id. (raising rulemaking challenges under 38 U.S.C. § 502).
543. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1120; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a)(1)(iv)
(2019) (relating to the standard for considering errors related to changes in
interpretation of statutes or regulation).
544. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1120; see also 38 C.F.R. § 14.636(c)(1)(i)
(relating to how agents and attorneys charge fees); § 20.202(c)(2) (relating to the
process by which a claimant can modify information in a Notice of Disagreement).
545. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1120; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(b) (relating to
“submitting an intent to file a claim” to VA); § 3.156(b) (relating to the consideration
of new evidence for legacy claims that were not under the modernized system);
§ 3.2500(b), (d) (relating to the prohibition on entering concurrent avenues for
reviewing decision and establishing the process for withdrawing from the process););
§ 20.205(c) (relating to the effect of filing a withdrawal of appeal).
546. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1120; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(p)(1)–(2)
(relating to the definition of initial claims and supplemental claims); § 3.103(c)(2)
(relating to how VA treats evidence received after the agency issues a notice of
decision); § 3.151(c)(1)–(2) (relating to how VA makes determinations for claims that
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When considering associational standing, the court considers the
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission547 factors: “(a) its
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b)
the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted, nor relief requested
requires the participation of individual members of the lawsuit.”548The
first prong is whether there are members who have standing to sue in
their own right.549 The Federal Circuit found that PVA had veteran
members personally impacted by § 3.2500(b) and § 3.155.550 However,
PVA’s challenge to § 20.202(c)(2) and § 3.156(b) failed to identify a
member who had presented an injury that was actual or imminent.551
Further, § 3.2500(d)–(e) and § 20.205(c) were related to potential
future harms and not actual harms to current veterans.552 MVA’s
challenge to § 3.105(a)(1)(iv) attempted to obtain standing through a
veteran-member who challenged an adverse decision as clear and
unmistakable error by relying on a change in interpretation of the law
for Blue Water Veterans.553 However, the Federal Circuit found this
issue moot, since Congress had remedied the effective date issue for
Blue Water Veterans.554
The several petitioners also argued that their attorney members have
standing on their own.555 The court looked to how the attorneys are
adversely affected by these rules and found that the potential loss of
attorney’s fees was insufficient to create an Article III case or
controversy.556 The court, however, addressed MVA’s challenge to
encompass multiple issues); §§ 14.636(c)(2)–(3) (relating how agents and attorneys
charge fees); § 20.202(a) (relating to Notice of Disagreements); § 20.800(e) (relating
to the requirement to file new Notices of Disagreement after new adjudications after
a remand).
547. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
548. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1122–23 (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
549. Id. at 1123.
550. See id. at 1124 (recognizing that the regulations adversely affected the
supplemental claims of two veterans).
551. See id. (finding the challenges too vague because the PVA could not identify
any particular veteran).
552. See id. (finding the challenges relating to these regulations were nothing more
than “‘some day’ intentions” that did not identify “actual or imminent injury”).
553. Id. at 1125.
554. Id.; see also Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-23,
133 Stat. 966 (2019) (remedying the effective date issue).
555. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1125.
556. Id. at 1125–28.
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§ 14.636(c)(1)(i) separately.557 The court found that this regulation
“directly affects attorney’s fees—by restricting fees for work performed
on supplemental claims filed more than a year” later.558 Additionally,
MVA had a specific member who was personally denied fees of over
$50,000 for work performed.559 Finally, the court rejected Carpenter
Chartered’s petition because it found no injury in fact over the
challenged rules.560
C. Overturned Regulations
Three challenged regulations survived standing, and the Federal
Circuit overturned all three: 38 C.F.R. §§ 14.636(c)(1)(i), 3.2500(b),
and 3.155.561 All three challenges related to the supplemental claim
lane.562
1. The Federal Circuit overturned § 14.636(c)(1)(i) because it was contrary
to § 5904(c)(1)
First, § 14.636(c)(1)(i) limited when a veteran’s representative may
charge a fee for work on supplemental claims.563 MVA’s petition
challenged this regulation specifically.564 In this challenge, the Court
first looked to the history and statutory framework of attorney’s fees.565
Beginning in 1864, attorney’s fees were strictly limited to ten
dollars.566 This ten dollar framework continued until Congress enacted
the VJRA in 1988.567 The VJRA only allowed attorney’s fees after the

557. See id. at 1128 (finding sufficient facts to sustain standing).
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Id. at 1132.
561. Id. at 1132–33, 1148.
562. Id. at 1133 (noting that the supplemental claim procedural lane “permit[s] a
claimant to request readjudication of an initial claim based on ‘new and relevant
evidence’”).
563. Id.; see also 38 C.F.R. § 14.636(c)(1)(ii) (2020) (“[A]ttorneys may charge
claimants or appellants for representation provided after an agency of original
jurisdiction has issued notice of an initial decision on the claim . . .”).
564. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1127–28.
565. Id. at 1135 (noting that Congress had changed the triggering event for
charging attorney’s fees three times in the past).
566. Id.
567. Id.
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Board made its final decision on the case.568 The Senate distinguished
reopening from initial claims because the veteran’s need for an
attorney was greater.569 In 2006, Congress allowed paid representation
after an NOD was filed in the case.570 Congress acknowledged the
complexity of VA cases, and the need for representation by
attorneys.571
The AMA shifted the timeframe, allowing attorney’s fees to be
collected after a claimant receives an initial decision.572 Because the
AMA allows for many different avenues of relief—including NOD,
HLR, and supplemental claims—Congress had to shift the timeframe
in which attorneys obtain their fees.573
Section 14.636 allowed attorneys to charge a fee for work performed
after the Regional Office has issued an initial decision on the claim.574
The agency, however, did not allow fees for supplemental claims that
were outside of the appeals window.575 Under the AMA, a claimant may
file a supplemental claim under two separate circumstances.576 Under
38 U.S.C. § 5104C(a), a supplemental claim can be filed within a year
of a decision.577 Under these supplemental claims, the claimant has
continuously pursued the claim and is now submitting “new and
relevant evidence” to support their claim.578 Under continuously
pursued supplemental claims, the claimant preserves their effective
date to the date in which they originally began pursuing the claim.579
For example, if the claimant filed an application in 2019 and
continued to appeal through the various lanes—HLR, NOD, and now

568. Id.; see also Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 104, 102 Stat.
4105, 4108 (1988) (“[A] fee may not be charged, allowed, or paid for services of agents
and attorneys with respect to services provided before the date on which the Board of
Veterans’ Appeals first makes a final decision in the case.”).
569. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1136; Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 104, 102 Stat. at
4108.
570. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1136; 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) (2006).
571. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1136 (noting that Congress acknowledged
that “the claims process has become very complex”).
572. Id.; 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1).
573. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1136.
574. Id. at 1137; 38 C.F.R. § 14.636(c)(i).
575. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1137; 38 C.F.R. § 14.636(c)(ii).
576. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1137.
577. Id. at 1133.
578. Id.
579. See id. at 1134–35 (noting the difference between supplemental claims
continuously pursued and those not).
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a supplemental claim—once they are granted the benefit, it will go
back to the 2019 filing date.
Comparatively, § 5104C(b) allows claimants to file a supplemental
claim with “new and relevant evidence,” outside of the one-year
appeals period.580 However, under § 5104C(b), the claimant’s effective
date is the date of the new supplemental claim.581 In this circumstance,
§ 14.636 did not allow attorneys to charge a fee for claimants.582 VA
argued that § 5104C(b) supplemental claims are separate claims for
the purposes of attorney’s fees and that reopened claims are “finallydecided claims based on new evidence.”583
MVA argued that VA’s regulation was contrary to § 5904(c)(1).584
Congress provided that attorney’s fees “may not be charged . . . for
services . . . provided before the date on which a claimant is provided
notice of the agency of original jurisdiction’s initial decision . . . with
respect to the case.”585 The Federal Circuit, in Judge Chen’s opinion,
agreed and found that § 14.636(c)(1)(i) contradicted the meaning of
5904(c)(1).586 The court found that a supplemental claim under
§ 5104C(b) occurs after a notice of the Regional Office decision with
respect to the case.587 Both the supplemental claim and the original
Regional Office decision are part of the same case, and, although there
are different effective dates between § 5104C(a) and (b), both of these
claims are treated the same for attorney’s fees purposes.588
Additionally, the court found that the statutes recite no other
restrictions on attorney’s fees.589 Congress’s language in § 5904(c)(1)
permitted paid representation regardless of the review the claimant
chose.590 The Federal Circuit found that section 14.636(c)(1)(i)
contradicted the ordinary meaning of § 5904(c)(1), and thus the court
invalidated the provision.591

580. Id. at 1133–34.
581. Id. at 1134–35.
582. Id. at 1137 (“[A] § 5104C(b) supplemental claim . . . [must] be first denied
before paid representation is available.”).
583. Id. at 1137–38.
584. Id. at 1135; see also 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1).
585. See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1).
586. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1138.
587. Id.
588. Id. at 1138–39.
589. Id. at 1138.
590. Id.
591. Id. at 1141.
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Now that the court overturned § 14.636(c)(1)(i), attorneys can
charge a contingency fee for their work on all supplemental claims.592
This will allow veterans to obtain attorney representation more readily,
and an attorney will have an incentive to take the case at the
supplemental claim stage, regardless of when the veteran last received
a decision.
2. The Federal Circuit invalidated § 3.2500(b) for contravening § 5104C’s
clear statutory text
Second, § 3.2500(b) barred the filing of a supplemental claim when
adjudication of the same claim was pending before a federal court.593
PVA challenged § 3.2500(b).594 Here, the court found that PVA had
standing because one of its members was barred from filing a
supplemental claim while he had a pending appeal in federal court.595
Under § 3.2500(b), VA places “two restrictions on the use of
administrative review.”596 First, a claimant cannot file for review under
two different administrative appeals options.597 PVA, however, only
challenged the second restriction that a claimant may not file for
administrative review while the claim is pending before a federal
court.598 The court acknowledged that this prohibition primarily
affects claimants who filed an appeal from the Board but now have new
and relevant evidence to submit a supplemental claim.599 In its petition,
PVA argued that the new restrictions were not contemplated in the
statute.600 Further, PVA argued, this restriction would force claimants
to make a difficult choice between appellate review by the Federal
Circuit and filing a supplemental claim, since the effective date
protections only exist if a supplemental claim is filed after a Veterans
Court decision, Board decision, or an agency of original jurisdiction
(AOJ) decision.601

592. See id. (allowing attorneys to charge a contingency fee).
593. Id.; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.2500(b) (“While the adjudication of a specific benefit
is pending on appeal before a federal court, a claimant may not file for administrative
review of the claim . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
594. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1122, 1124.
595. Id. at 1124.
596. Id. at 1141; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.2500(b).
597. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1142.
598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Id.
601. Id.
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The Federal Circuit determined that it was the clear intent of
Congress to allow administrative review and judicial review
concurrently.602 Congress knew how to bar two simultaneous forms of
review but only chose to bar concurrent lanes of administrative
review.603 The court determined that “§ 3.2500(b) is invalid for
contravening § 5104C’s clear statutory text.”604
Now that the court has overturned § 3.2500(b), claimants may be
able to file both supplemental claims and appeal to a federal court
without the fear of losing an effective date. This will give veterans a
chance to both challenge a law and ensure that their effective date is
preserved.
3. The Federal Circuit found § 3.155 invalid because it was arbitrary and
capricious
Lastly, § 3.155 restricted the use of the intent-to-file framework for
supplemental claims.605 An intent-to-file framework allows a veteran to
notify VA of their intentions to file a claim.606 The intent to file would
preserve the effective date, so long as the veteran filed the claim within
a year.607 PVA challenged the regulation, and the court found it had
standing on behalf of one of its members.608 A PVA member submitted
an intent to file on July 24, 2018, and he believed he had a year to apply
for benefits.609 Because of § 3.155, the PVA member’s intent to file did
not hold his effective date, and he was only awarded back to the date
of his supplemental claim.610
The regulation specifically states that an intent to file does not apply
to supplemental claims.611 PVA argued that § 3.155(b) is arbitrary and
capricious because the “VA interprets ‘virtually identical’ statutory

602. Id. at 1144.
603. Id.
604. Id. at 1145.
605. See id. at 1145 n.18, 1146 (noting that “[u]nder the ‘intent-to-file’ framework,
a claimant may signal a preliminary intent to apply for benefits” in three ways).
606. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(b).
607. Id.
608. See Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1124 (finding the “veteran members
suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the alleged shortcomings of the
challenged regulations”).
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. Id. at 1146.
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language in § 5110(a)(1) and § 5110(a)(3) inconsistently.”612
§ 5110(a)(1) states that an initial claim for benefits “shall not be earlier
than the date of receipt of application therefor.”613 § 5110(a)(3)
provides that the effective date of a supplemental claim “shall not be
earlier than the date of receipt of the supplemental claim.”614 However,
VA’s regulations only allow for intent to file in § 5110(A)(1) new
claims, but do not allow for intent to file in § 5110(a)(3) supplemental
claims.615 The Federal Circuit agreed with PVA and found that the
regulation was arbitrary and capricious.616 The court thus invalidated
§ 3.155(b).617
Since the court has overturned § 3.155(b), veterans will be able to
establish or preserve an effective date by filing an intent to file before
that of a supplemental claim. This mechanism may give veterans more
time to collect their evidence to meet the new and relevant threshold.
Additionally, many veterans who filed an intent to file before a
supplemental claim may now be able to argue that the intent to file was
valid, and their effective date should be earlier.
4.

Future of other AMA regulatory challenges
Because of National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. (NOVA)
v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs,618 these regulations can now be challenged
until 2025, within six years of the finalized regulations.619 Each of these
failed challenges has laid the groundwork for veterans and advocates
to challenge other regulations directly through § 502 petitions or
through appeals to the Veterans Court.
For instance, § 3.156(b) was challenged by NOVA and PVA, but the
court dismissed the challenge due to lack of standing.620 Under the
Legacy System, § 3.156(b) required VA to readjudicate a claim when it
received new evidence prior to the expiration of the appeal period.621
Veterans in the AMA system do not get the benefit of constructive

612. Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)(1), (3) (effective dates of a awards).
613. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)(3).
614. See Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1146.
615. Id.
616. Id. at 1147 (noting the contradictory nature of § 3.155 to other provisions of
the regulation).
617. Id.
618. 981 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (en banc).
619. Id. at 1386.
620. Military-Veterans Advoc., 7 F.4th at 1127.
621. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b).
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receipt, like those in the Legacy System.622 If a veteran submitted a
document within a year of a rating decision but failed to affirmatively
appeal, that veteran may have standing to either challenge the rule
directly to the Federal Circuit or challenge the rule through the Board
and Veterans Court in a later decision.623 VA’s new rule requires the
veteran to affirmatively appeal, rather than allow that new document,
forcing VA to reconsider the claim.624 NOVA and PVA’s petition has
outlined how veterans can challenge this rule as arbitrary and
capricious.625
In another instance, § 20.202(a) was challenged by Carpenter
Chartered, but the court also dismissed the claim due to lack of
standing.626 Section 20.202(a) requires that an appeal to the Board
specifically identify the decision and issues with which the veteran
disagrees.627 Carpenter Chartered provided a framework to challenge the
regulatory language as being plainly inconsistent with the statute.628 38
U.S.C. § 7105 states that notice of disagreements “shall identify the
specific determination with which the claimant disagrees.”629 The
regulation, on the other hand, requires that the NOD identify the
specific decision and issue, or issues therein, with which the claimant
disagrees.630 Carpenter Chartered argued that the regulatory language
was arbitrary and capricious and inconsistent with the statutory
framework.631 If the Board dismisses an NOD for a missing date or
issue, the Board will likely dismiss the NOD based on the regulation. A
veteran would likely be in the position to appeal that decision and
challenge section 20.202(a) directly to the Veterans Court. Each of

622. See Reply Brief of Petitioner & Intervenor at 24–25, Nat’l Org. of Veterans’
Advocs., Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affs., 981 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (No. 2020-1321)
(articulating that constructive receipt treated evidence that was “received within one
year following an initial decision . . . as though it was filed with the underlying claim”).
623. Id. at 24.
624. Id. at 27.
625. See id. at 26–27 (arguing that the rule leads to absurd results and forces
claimants to file supplemental claims).
626. Military-Veterans Advoc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affs., 7 F.4th 1110, 1132 (Fed. Cir.
2021).
627. 38 C.F.R. § 20.202(a).
628. Petitioner’s Brief at 45–47, Carpenter Chartered v. Sec’y of Veterans’ Affs., No.
2019-1685, (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2019).
629. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(2)(A).
630. 38 C.F.R. § 20.202(a).
631. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 628, at 46–47.
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these petitions will help future advocates as they decide whether, as
well as how, to challenge the new AMA regulations.
VIII. SMITH V. MCDONOUGH AND REASONABLE EAJA FEES
This year, the Federal Circuit had the opportunity to resolve an issue
regarding reasonable compensation for attorneys’ work on veterans
claims. As the number of veterans’ cases represented by attorneys
increases every year, the issue of attorney’s fees will continue to be one
to watch at the court.632
In Smith v. McDonough,633 the Federal Circuit addressed
compensation for initial review of a veteran’s “record before the
agency” (RBA) under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).634 The
EAJA statute awards a prevailing party in litigation against the United
States fees and expenses, including attorney’s fees, if the position of
the United States against the party was not substantially justified.635
Mr. Smith received a decision granting him relief at the Veterans
Court, and his attorney applied for attorney’s fees worth $10,207.27,
which included eighteen hours of review of the 9,389-page RBA.636 The
Secretary objected to the amount of time billed for an initial review of
the case because Mr. Smith prevailed on only one of seven claims at
the Veterans Court.637 The Veterans Court limited the initial review of
the case to six hours of billable time because “counsel’s review of the
RBA in this case ‘presumably pertained to both the prevailing and
nonprevailing [sic] issues.’”638 The time the Veterans Court eliminated
from the bill were the hours the Veterans Court believed the attorney
likely spent reviewing the RBA’s unsuccessful claims.639 To support this
decision, the Veterans Court relied on its 2013 decision in Cline v.
Shinseki.640 Cline involved an attorney’s petition for paralegal time spent

632. For example, in 2018, the number of attorney fee applications filed at the
Veterans Court was 3,663. 2018 VET. APP. ANN. REP. 1. In 2019, that number rose to
5,948. 2019 VET. APP. ANN. REP. 1. In 2020, the number was 6,512. 2020 VET. APP. ANN.
REP. 1. This trend has been growing since 2012.
633. 995 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
634. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 201, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504).
635. Id. § 203(a)(1).
636. Smith, 995 F.3d at 1341.
637. Id. at 1342.
638. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
639. Id.
640. 26 Vet. App. 325 (2013).
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working on a case.641 The Veterans Court in Cline noted that Mr. Cline’s
attorney did not seek attorney’s fees for unsuccessful issues, but it
appeared that the paralegal hours claimed were for both successful
and unsuccessful issues; therefore, the court adjusted the fees so as not
to award fees for “work spent solely on . . . unsuccessful claims.”642
Relying on this language, the Veterans Court held that “Cline clearly
supports the notion that some reductions are appropriate for time
spent reviewing and annotating the record with regard to
nonprevailing issues.”643
The Federal Circuit reversed this holding of the Veterans Court,
finding that the Veterans Court had misinterpreted the EAJA statute.644
Recognizing that attorneys reviewing a case for the first time have no
appreciation for which claims will and will not succeed, the Federal
Circuit acknowledged that an “educated guess” on behalf of the
counsel requires research into the case.645 This is undoubtedly true in
veterans’ cases because, for many veterans, the first time an attorney
looks at their case is when they enter the adversarial arena of judicial
review, having been represented by non-attorney Veterans Service
Organizations before that.646 Citing to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Hensley v. Eckerhart,647 the court recognized that, while time spent
working on unsuccessful claims may not be recovered by an attorney,
“a lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims . . . [and
courts] should focus on the significance of the overall relief
obtained.”648
In reversing the Veterans Court’s decision regarding recovery for
work spent in the initial stages of review, the Federal Circuit held that:
the law requires that Mr. Smith’s counsel be compensated for time
that was necessarily expended on the initial review of the record,
regardless of whether some of the claims that came from that review
ultimately were found not to prevail, if that time was necessary for a
successful appeal. Time spent reviewing the record is indispensable
641. Id. at 331.
642. Id. (quoting Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 9, 15 (2012)).
643. Smith v. Wilkie, No. 17-4391, 2019 WL 6258854, at *3 (Vet. App. Nov. 25,
2019), rev’d in part, Smith v. McDonough, 995 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
644. Smith, 995 F.3d at 1345–46 (observing that the law compensates counsel for
time spent on the initial review whether or not the claims ultimately prevailed).
645. Id. at 1343.
646. Id. at 1345.
647. 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983).
648. Smith, 995 F.3d at 1344 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435
(1983)).
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to pursuing any appeal, regardless of how many issues are ultimately
appealed and regardless of the degree of success.649

Noting that the inquiry should focus on whether the time the
attorney spent on the case was “reasonably expended,” the Federal
Circuit found that the attorney’s careful reading and notetaking of the
record while reviewing the RBA was a situation in which the time spent
on successful and unsuccessful claims could not be differentiated.650
This holding is quite reassuring to attorneys representing veterans
at the Veterans Court—particularly to those who have had no
opportunity to represent the veteran previously. Many hours can be
spent reviewing the RBA, which can range from a few hundred pages
to upwards of several tens of thousands, to determine which of a
veteran’s claims have merit and which should be abandoned. Attorney
compensation for an entire review of the record at this stage makes
sense and will likely encourage a thorough review of a veteran’s claims
record for every potentially successful issue.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit continues to establish important precedent in
veterans benefit cases, focusing on congressional intent, equitable
principles and the contours of the adjudicative system. Its decisions are
not always unanimous, but always precedential, as the Federal Circuit
has exclusive jurisdiction to hear veterans benefit cases.
Incredibly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in not one—but
two—of the Federal Circuit cases discussed in this Area Summary.651
Veterans advocates eagerly await the Supreme Court’s decisions in the
George and Arellano cases discussed above.652 Our nation’s veterans
benefit from the robust discussion found in Federal Circuit decisions
inspired by zealous representation from veterans advocates. It is our
hope this Area Summary assists the veterans legal community as it stays
abreast of developments in the law.

649. Id. at 1345.
650. Id. at 1345–46.
651. See George v. McDonough, 142 S. Ct. 858 (2022); Arellano v. McDonough, No.
21-432, 2022 WL 515866 (Feb. 22, 2022).
652. See supra Sections VI.B, V.A.

